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Abstract
Institutions of Higher Education (IHEs) have wrangled with state governmental agencies
for decades about the role the government should assume in overseeing campus operations.
IHEs continue to argue that government intrusion impedes efficient IHE operation. Government
agencies counter that IHEs are provided tax dollars to complete the job of educating the states’
citizens and that IHEs must abide by the rules and regulations set by the state. However, over
the last two decades, state funding for IHEs is at an all-time low; yet governments still dictate
how IHEs operate. With decreased state funding, IHEs sought to replace those funds by
focusing on external funding sources such as tuitions. These issues strain the relationship
between IHEs and state governments resulting in IHEs calling for more autonomy in campus
operations.
In 2005, the Commonwealth of Virginia passed the Restructured Higher Education
Financial and Administrative Operations Act, known as the Restructuring Act. This legislation
created a unique autonomy system in Virginia that provided IHEs an opportunity to obtain
substantial autonomy over their affairs. This dissertation reports results of research seeking to
better understand the autonomy system in Virginia. This study examined pre-autonomy Virginia
Commonwealth University (VCU) (2006-2008) and post-Autonomy III VCU (2009-2015).
Post-Autonomy III VCU has complete autonomy over its finances and operations and are not
under the authority of the Commonwealth of Virginia. This study sought to determine if postAutonomy III VCU had higher minority enrollment percentages, smaller administrative and
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management staff percentages, and higher axillary revenue percentages. Also, this research
reviewed minority enrollment percentages, administrative and management staffing percentages,
and auxiliary revenue percentages to determine if autonomy status influenced Virginia
Commonwealth University’s minority enrollment percentages, administrative and staffing
percentages, and auxiliary revenue percentages compared to non-autonomous comparative IHEs
in Virginia.
The Delta Cost Project Database (DCPD) was created in 2007 to make the Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) more usable for longitudinal research (American
Institutes of Research, 2017). In 2012, the American Institutes for Research (AIR) assumed
responsibility for the database while the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES)
maintained the database. The data stored in the DCPD spans from 1987-2015 (AIR, 2017). The
DCPD provides data on 184 public IHEs in the United States (AIR, 2017). The DCPD database
also includes data related to enrollment and administrative expenditures, as well as auxiliary
expenditures.
The research conducted within this dissertation yielded promising results. PostAutonomy III VCU possessed a more diverse enrollment and employed less administrative and
management staff. Further, VCU created a higher percentage of revenue for auxiliary enterprises
and possessed a higher percentage of minority enrollment than non-autonomous IHEs in
Virginia.
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This research was designed to gain a better understanding of the autonomy system in
Virginia. The results indicate that a relationship exists between autonomy and how IHEs
operate. Further research on autonomy in higher education is needed to determine how
autonomy impacts efficiency. However, to date, little research exists related to this topic in the
United States. This study contributes to our understanding of and raises future research question
about the relationship between institutional autonomy and multiple institutional outcome

iv

DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to my family and all of those who love the field of higher
education.

v

List of Abbreviations & Symbols
AC

Academic Capitalism

AIR

American Institutes for Research

B

Beta Value

BOV

Board of Visitors

CAFR

Comprehensive Annual Financial Report

DCPD

Delta Cost Project Database

DiD

Difference-in-Difference

EVA

Electronic Procurement System

F

F-Value

HE

Higher Education

IHE

Institutions of Higher Education

IPEDS

Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System

IEES

Institutional Equity Effectiveness and Success

IT

Information Technology

M

Mean

MOOCS

Massive Online Open Courses

NCES

National Center for Educational Statistics

NIH

National Institutes of Health

N

Number of Data Points

NSF

National Science Foundation

P

P-Value

vi

PAT

Principal-Agent Theory

𝑅2

Variance

RA

Restructured Higher Education Financial and Administrative Operations Act

RI

Carnegie Classification for High Research Activity

SCHEV

State Council of Higher Education for Virginia

SD

Standard Deviation

SE

Standard Error

SHEEO

State Higher Education Executive Officers Association

SWAM

Small, Women-Owned and Minority-Owned Businesses

UK

United Kingdom

USA

United States of America

VCU

Virginia Commonwealth University

vii

Acknowledgements
First and foremost I thank God for without HIS steadfast love this dissertation would not
be possible. Without a doubt, HE was my rock throughout this process.
I would like to express the sincerest of thanks to my dissertation chair, Dr. Neal
Hutchens. Dr. Hutchens challenged me from the very beginning to do two things during this
process, read and think. I took that to heart, and I firmly believe that doctoral students should
spend time reading and thinking to complete the doctoral degree. Further, I would like to thank
Dr. Hutchens for his mentorship and friendship. Dr. Hutchens provided wise and generous
counsel during this process and prevented me from quitting when I felt like this process was too
difficult. Dr. Hutchens, thank you for being my mentor, professor, and friend.
To the other members of my committee, Dr. Marie Barnard, Dr. Phillis George, and Dr.
Frank Fernandez, thank you so very much for your guidance during this process. Dr. Barnard,
your tutoring during your time as Director of CERE prepared me for this moment. Dr. George,
your theory class allowed me to understand the deeper meaning of what a doctoral candidate is
and the type of work that doctoral candidates should produce. Dr. Fernandez, thank you so much
for guiding me in how to narrow my topic into a workable dissertation. You helped convince me
to change my thought processes numerous times and your efforts are much appreciated. Thank
you all so very much from the bottom of my heart.
A special thank you to Dr. Richard Balkin. Your statistics classes prepared me for this
moment and your willingness to help me with statistics questions when Dr. Fernandez moved
was very much appreciated. Thank you!

viii

To Coach Glasgow, you saw something special in me from an early age and you never
quit on me. From coaching me in the 6th grade to teaching me world history in high school, you
always pushed me and disciplined me when I needed it. There were times in high school when
most people wanted to write me off, but you did not. I’m here today because of you. I am
forever grateful to you for all of the life lessons you taught me.
To my late mother, you would be so proud of me for this accomplishment. I so wish you
were here to celebrate this with me. You always told me that I could do anything! You taught
me empathy and always told me that the most important thing anyone can do is to care for others
and love God. You were the best mother in the world. To my father, I never wanted for a thing
in my life. I graduated with my two undergraduate degrees without incurring debt. Thank you
for providing for my every physical need.
To my family, Angela and Sara, I owe every success in my life to the two of you. You
inspire me and motivate me to want to be successful. You pick me up when I am down and make
me laugh when I want to cry. Without the two of you, I am not here today. I love you both more
than I can express with words, and I hope my actions reflect my feelings. I never want to do life
without the two of you. Trey, you are such a blessing to our family, and I’m thankful for you
being in our lives. You are an answered prayer and such a wonderful son-in-law. I love you.
To all of my family and friends who prayed for me and served as my cheerleaders, I am
forever grateful. Thank you all so very much.

ix

Table of Contents
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... ii
DEDICATION............................................................................................................................... v
List of Abbreviations & Symbols................................................................................................ vi
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... viii
List of Tables .............................................................................................................................. xiii
Chapter 1 - Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1
Statement of the Problem ....................................................................................................... 3
Purpose of the Study ............................................................................................................... 4
Significance of Study ............................................................................................................... 5
Local Context ........................................................................................................................... 8
Conceptual Framework .......................................................................................................... 8
Research Questions ................................................................................................................. 9
Limitations .............................................................................................................................. 10
Organization of the Study .................................................................................................... 11
Chapter 2 - Literature Review ................................................................................................... 12
The Transition from the Liberal Arts IHE to the Entrepreneurial IHE ........................... 12
The Entrepreneurial University ............................................................................................ 15
Defining Autonomy ................................................................................................................. 17
Measuring Autonomy ............................................................................................................. 21
Mismatch of IHE Definitions ................................................................................................. 24
State Funding for Higher Education ..................................................................................... 26
The Commonwealth of Virginia and Virginia Commonwealth University....................... 27
Chapter 3 – Conceptual Framework and Methodology .......................................................... 36
Conceptual Framework ........................................................................................................ 37
Research Questions and Hypotheses ..................................................................................... 38
x

Population ................................................................................................................................ 40
Data Collection and Analysis ................................................................................................. 41
Limitations of the Study ......................................................................................................... 44
Chapter 4 – Results ..................................................................................................................... 45
Findings from Minority Enrollment for Pre- and Post-Autonomy III VCU .................... 46
Table 1...................................................................................................................................... 47
Findings from Administrative/Management Staffing for Pre- and Post-Autonomy III
VCU .......................................................................................................................................... 47
Table 2...................................................................................................................................... 48
Findings from the Auxiliary Revenue for Pre- and Post-Autonomy III at VCU .............. 48
Table 3...................................................................................................................................... 49
Findings from Post-Autonomy III VCU and Comparative IHEs Minority Enrollment . 49
Table 4...................................................................................................................................... 50
Table 5...................................................................................................................................... 51
Findings from Post-Autonomy III VCU and Comparative IHEs Administrative and
Management Staffing ............................................................................................................. 52
Table 6...................................................................................................................................... 53
Table 7...................................................................................................................................... 53
Findings from Post-Autonomy III VCU and Comparative IHEs Auxiliary Revenues .... 54
Table 8...................................................................................................................................... 55
Table 9...................................................................................................................................... 55
Summary.................................................................................................................................. 57
Chapter 5-Discussion .................................................................................................................. 58
Discussion of Results ............................................................................................................... 59
Implications ............................................................................................................................. 63
Limitations .............................................................................................................................. 67

xi

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 68
References .................................................................................................................................... 71
Appendices ................................................................................................................................... 87
Curriculum Vita ........................................................................................................................ 151

xii

List of Tables
1. Pre-Autonomy and Post-Autonomy III VCU Minority Enrollment Means…………..47
2. Pre-Autonomy and Post-Autonomy III VCU Administrative and Management Staffing
Means………………………………………………………………………………….48
3. Pre-Autonomy and Post-Autonomy III VCU Auxiliary Revenue Means…………......49
4. Descriptive Statistics for Comparative IHES and VCU Minority Enrollment……......50
5. Linear Regression Results for Minority Enrollment………………………………......51
6. Descriptive Statistics for Comparative IHES and VCU Administrative and Management
Staff……………………………………………………………………………………52
7. Linear Regression Results for Administrative and Management Staff………………..53
8. Descriptive Statistics of Comparative IHEs and VCU Auxiliary Revenue by Revenue
Status…………………………………………………………………………………..55
9. Linear Regression Results for Auxiliary Revenue…………………………………….55

xiii

Chapter 1 - Introduction
Over the past twenty years, higher education experienced a shift in financial operations.
Prior to this time, public institutions of higher education (IHEs) received a large portion of their
total budget from state and federal governmental sources. Scott and Hart (1991) wrote about this
shift in higher education finances in the 1990s. These researchers noticed that IHEs started to
shift their focus from the traditional liberal arts model to a more research-based model in order to
compensate for reduced governmental funding at that time. This research-based model with a
focus on external funding helped IHEs offset diminished public funding in an effort to continue
pursuing their missions (Scott & Hart, 1991). With these operational changes and shifts, IHEs
sought alternate, external funding sources for continued operations to provide postsecondary
opportunities to students and to conduct research that contributed to society.
Researchers noted that during times of economic hardship, higher education is often one
of the first areas that public officials look to for funding cuts; thus, during the national recession
that began in 2008, IHEs experienced a definite reduction of state funding (Delaney, 2014;
Delaney & Doyle, 2011). In 1995, the State Higher Education Executive Officers Association
(SHEEO) reported that 12.9% of state budgets were used to fund higher education. This same
report showed that, only 9.6% of state budgets were allocated to fund higher education in 2019.
With this trend, IHEs sought external funding and had to increase reliance on student tuition
dollars to fund operations. State appropriations for higher education have increased between
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2008 and 2019; unfortunately, those increases are still 8.7% below the pre-recession
levels in 2008.
To further exacerbate these funding issues, student enrollment has declined for the past
eight years (2011-2019) across the USA (SHEEO, 2019). This enrollment decline took place at
a time when IHEs received the majority of their operating revenue from student tuition. Thus, a
perfect storm occurred with historic declines in state funding and the decline in student
enrollment where IHEs could not supplement the loss of public funding with student tuition
dollars (SHEEO, 2019). Due to the downward trend in enrollment and governmental funding,
IHEs privatized higher education or developed a business-like model for funding and operation
(Fryar, 2012; Liefner, 2003; Morphew & Eckel, 2009; Touthoushian, 2009; Liefner, 2003).
With public funding decreasing, some IHEs have sought reduced government oversight.
Prominent scholars researching IHE organizational structures have noted the strained
relationship between IHEs and governmental entities because even as government funding
decreased, IHE oversight by states has not decrease (Leslie & Berdahl, 2008; McLendon, 2003;
Reed et al., 2002). This tension between IHEs and governmental agencies significantly
increased due to the Great Recession of 2008 (Aliyeva, 2016).
While IHEs have always desired less oversight and more autonomy, the Great Recession
of 2008 provided the opportunity for IHEs to push harder for more autonomy. Schultz (2016)
noted that IHEs have petitioned for autonomy since the 1980s. As a result, states have created
various methods or policies to placate IHEs’ call for less oversight. Some states have created
governing boards (Bastedo, 2005). Some states have moved from governing boards to
coordinating boards to allow IHEs in those states more flexibility in decision-making (Marcus,
1997; McLendon, 2003). And some states created structures tying funding to outcomes deemed
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appropriate by the states (Alexander, 2000; Dougherty & Natow, 2015; Huisman & Currie, 2004;
McLendon et al., 2006; Stensaker & Harvey, 2011; Zumeta, 1998). Other states use oversight to
push a higher education agenda focused on increasing human capital and producing skilled
individuals in the most efficient manner (Winston, 1999). As a result, IHEs have sought a
balance and tried “to make adjustments to meet these political and social demands” required by
states (Aliyeva, 2016, p.5). Leslie et al. (2012) stated, “higher education institutions face a
challenge to provide their instruction, research, and services in an accessible, affordable, and
efficient way to satisfy the needs of their multiple stakeholders, who are increasingly concerned
about how funds are expended” (p. 615). Aliyeva (2016) observed that state governments often
pressure IHEs to be cost-effective in all areas of operations. Knott and Payne (2004) noted that
states want low tuition and high-quality education. In essence, IHEs have lobbied for autonomy
for decades while state governments regularly have ratcheted up oversight measures, even while
reducing state appropriations for higher education. During this time and particularly after the
Great Recession of 2008, IHEs pushed harder for more autonomy.
Statement of the Problem
Because state government funding of IHEs has dwindled since the 1990s, IHEs were
required to seek alternative funding sources (Liefner, 2003; SHEEO, 2019; Slaughter &
Rhoades, 2004; Zusman, 2005; Zumeta et al., 2012, Zusman, 2005). As this occurred,
researchers dubbed this different model of IHE funding as managerialism or academic
capitalism (AC) where IHEs focused on external funding sources and treated operational
mechanisms similarly to how corporations operate (Scott & Hart, 1991; Slaughter & Leslie,
2001). Even while state funding declined or remained stagnant, state governments wanted
to maintain high levels of oversight and exert control over IHE operations (Alexander,
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2000). Historically, as far back as 1959 and when state funding was at higher levels,
researchers noted that IHEs were wary of governmental oversight (Glenny & Dalglish,
1973; Moos & Rourke, 1959). These scholars stated that the only way for IHEs to achieve
their missions was through autonomy (Berdahl, 1971; Moos & Rourke, 1959). States have
reacted in various ways to IHEs demands for less oversight and more autonomy. Autonomy
and oversight have been topics of discussion in higher education circles for decades, and
these will likely continue to be discussed as scholars continue to research and write about
autonomy in higher education. (McLendon, 2003; Hutchens, 2007; Schultz, 2016; and
Aliyeva, 2016). One state, the Commonwealth of Virginia, provides an optimal location for
studying the balance between governmental oversight and IHE autonomy due to the IHE
autonomy legislation enacted in the Commonwealth. This study contributes to our
understanding of whether IHEs with greater levels of autonomy in the Commonwealth of
Virginia function at more efficient levels by measuring minority enrollment, administrative
spending, and auxiliary revenues.
Purpose of the Study
By researching the IHE autonomy system in the Commonwealth of Virginia, this
study will contribute to established knowledge by providing a better understanding of the
relationship between autonomy and spending patterns, as well as enrollment standards for
IHEs in the commonwealth. This research will provide IHE administrators, faculty, and
staff, as well as governmental agencies in the USA, more information about how autonomy
might impact IHE spending, as well as enrollment standards. Williamson’s (1985)
Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) provides the conceptual framework for this study. PAT
provides the model to help explain the relationship between state government as the
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principal and IHEs as the agents. Specifically, the study will explore the principal’s
(Commonwealth of Virginia) grant of additional autonomy to select agents (IHEs in the
Commonwealth of Virginia that qualify for additional autonomy) to determine the
relationship between IHE autonomy and its impact on spending patterns and enrollment
patterns at different IHEs in the Commonwealth.
Significance of Study
This study seeks to fill a void in a research area within higher education with
implications for better understanding how autonomy levels are related to multiple IHE
outcomes. As noted by SHEEO (2019), at 9.6%, IHEs are still well below the 12.9% budget
allocation from state governments in 1995. This decrease in funding from state
governments has helped create new pressures for IHEs to adopt practices associated with
managerialism or academic capitalism (AC) (Liefner, 2003; Rabvosky, 2012; Saunders,
2007; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997; Touthoushian, 2009). Prior research documents the
positive and negative impacts that have developed from AC. Positively, scientific discovery
has increased, and new technologies are developed more rapidly (Mendoza, 2012). Human
capital at IHEs has also improved along with IHEs increased prestige (Mendoza, 2012).
Negatively, IHEs have become production-oriented in terms of grant funding and
publication productivity, directly affecting women faculty and the liberal arts (Johnson &
Taylor, 2019; Williams, 2019; Aleman, 2014; Bensimon, 1995).
Researchers (Glenny, 1959; Berdhal, 1971 and 1990; Chambers, 1970; Nyborg,
2003; Hutchens, 2007) have previously studied autonomy at IHEs, but much of prior
research focused on defining attributes of autonomy and what led to IHEs demands for more
autonomy (Berdhal, 1971 and 1990; Chambers, 1970; Glenny, 1959; Hutchens, 2007;
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Nyborg, 2003). Other scholars have attempted to determine how to measure autonomy at
IHEs. Fisher (1988) noted that autonomy could be measured by the number of legislative acts,
and Aliyeva (2016) concluded that autonomy could be measured by the amount of control an
IHE has over its mission. Other scholars contended that autonomy should be measured by
financial flexibility and the amount of governmental intrusion into academics and research
(Aliyeva, 2016; Anderson and Johnson, 1998; Voogt and Volkwein, 1997)
Aliyeva (2016) focuses on the competing visions or priorities of IHEs compared to
state governments. State governments tend to focus on enrollment standards, graduation
rates, diverse student populations, as well as developing a skilled workforce (Alexander,
2000; Ewell, Jones, & Kelly, 2003; Knott & Payne, 2004; Payne & Roberts, 2002; Zumeta
et al., 2012). In terms of vision, IHEs focus on prestige and research production, which can
result in tension with state governmental goals for higher education (Brewer et al., 2004;
Leveille, 2005; Mohrman et al., 2008). Further, IHEs place their priority on prestige and
research due to the lack of state government funding (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Zumeta
et al., 2012; Zusman, 2005). Aliyeva (2016) noted that even as IHEs primarily fund their
way, state governments still want to decide how IHEs operate.
While not an overlooked research area, the literature on IHE autonomy is limited in
several areas. There are only a handful of studies that consider what autonomy looks like in
operation. Aliyeva (2016) looked at several IHEs with financial autonomy and found that
financially autonomous universities spend more funding on research. In contrast, IHEs that
depend on more on state government funds tend to spend more on instruction. In 2005, the
Commonwealth of Virginia passed the Restructured Higher Education Financial and
Administrative Operations Act, known as the Restructuring Act. The Restructuring Act created
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three levels of autonomy for IHEs, with what is known as Autonomy III being complete
autonomy. Leslie and Berdahl (2008) completed a three-year case study examining the three
institutions in Virginia that received Autonomy III classification in 2006, the first year of
eligibility. They found that three years into the Restructuring Act, Autonomy III positively
impacted capital projects and human resource management. Furthermore, their paper contended
that the ability to have management flexibility, save on construction, hold and manage funds, and
operate human resources with fewer constraints held promise for future IHEs seeking autonomy
(Leslie and Berdahl, 2008). More recent research conducted by Schultz (2016) determined that
Autonomy III IHEs in the Commonwealth enjoyed greater organizational flexibility, greater
efficiencies, better campus culture, and a better student experience. They also had the ability to
create their own vision, promote innovation, and rewards for performance. Schultz’s study,
published five years ago, provided a view of autonomy in action at Autonomy III IHEs through
the lens of administrators and policymakers (Schultz, 2016).
The autonomy legislation in Virginia provides a context to better understand the effects
of autonomy in institutional outcomes and how IHEs in the Commonwealth operate when
granted increased autonomy. Lines of inquiry include the impact of autonomy on efficiency
improvement, financial improvement, and creating a more diverse student enrollment. The
Restructuring Act for IHEs with Autonomy III could provide positive impacts, but due to the
lack of research in this area, these impacts remain unknown. The legislation in Virginia presents
the opportunity to determine how one institution, VCU, has responded to a grant of increased
autonomy.
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Local Context
This study will focus on autonomy in higher education. The Commonwealth of
Virginia statutorily created an IHE autonomy system, but there is little data to determine the
effectiveness of this autonomy system. This study will research spending and revenue as
well as enrollment patterns at Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU). In 2008, VCU
received the highest level of autonomy within the system, Autonomy III. VCU was chosen
by the researcher because data can be accessed for VCU three years before receiving
autonomy and eight years after receiving autonomy.
Conceptual Framework
Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) is based on the delegation of tasks between two
entities’ resources (Braun & Guston, 2003). One entity, the principal, possesses a resource
but does not possess the ability to complete a task. For example, one might have plenty of
money but not the skill to build a house. Therefore, the principal needs an agent, a person or
entity that completes the task. For example, the agent would be the contractor hired to build
the house. The agent agrees to conduct the principal's business at an agreed-upon fee,
whether monetary or otherwise. Further, a relationship/contract develops between the
principal and the agent who then become actors in this process (Braun & Guston, 2003).
Williamson (1985) noted that this relationship is sometimes unstable as actors typically
maintain self-interest to maximize their welfare. Further, Williamson (1985) noted that the
principal cannot be sure that the agent will perform at the agreed-upon level, which can
result in sub-par performance from the principal’s perspective.
Aliyeva (2016) used PAT to research the relationship between IHEs and state
governments. The paper noted Aliyeva (2016) found that IHEs with some form of financial
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autonomy used more funds for research and innovation. Additionally, the author noted that
IHEs relying more heavily on state government funding used a high percentage of that
funding for instruction. They also argued that the PAT is appropriate because a contractual
relationship exists between the state government (principal) and the IHEs (agent) in the state
(Aliyeva, 2016). PAT provides a useful theory to help guide this study because IHEs and state
governments traditionally have a relationship that operates under PAT. The state holds the
funding or resources as the principal actor, and the IHE as the agent knows how to carry out the
task of providing postsecondary education in the state.
This study will be conducted using a panel data analysis and a fixed-effects model.
Aliyeva (2016) conducted a panel data analysis using a fixed-effects model to determine whether
IHEs with financial autonomy spend their funds differently than IHEs that do not possess
financial autonomy. This study will also use panel data sources to determine how one IHE
possessing Autonomy III in the Commonwealth of Virginia, VCU, spends funds compared to
IHEs in the Commonwealth without lower levels of autonomy. This study will use the Delta
Cost Project Data (DCPD) panel data to determine how Autonomy III impacts auxiliary revenue,
administrative and management staffing, and student minority enrollment.
Research Questions
With the Restructuring Act, the Commonwealth of Virginia statutorily created an
autonomy system for IHEs that frees institutions with the highest statutory autonomy from
substantial types of state regulation. As a result, IHEs with such autonomy are largely
responsible for their own oversight. IHEs in the Commonwealth with Level III Autonomy do
not have to bid out construction projects. These institutions can also streamline their institutional
management, as well as create their own enrollment policies. For this study, I hypothesize that

9

one institution, Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU), which received Autonomy III status
in 2008, will possess a more diverse enrollment, have fewer administrative managers and staff,
and create more revenue through auxiliary enterprises when compared to the university prior to
gaining Autonomy III status. Further, VCU will possess a more diverse enrollment, have fewer
administrative managers and staff, and create more revenue within auxiliary enterprises than
comparative Virginia public IHEs. To research my hypothesis, I will use DCPD data to conduct
a longitudinal (2005-2015) study of VCU and comparative Virginia institutions and will address
the following research questions:
•

How do minority enrollment percentages, administrative staffing percentages, and
auxiliary revenue percentages at Virginia Commonwealth University differ before
receiving (2005-2008) and after receiving Autonomy III status (2008-2015)?

•

How do minority enrollment percentages, administrative staffing percentages, and
auxiliary revenue percentages differ between post Autonomy III status Virginia
Commonwealth University and comparative public IHEs in Virginia?

Limitations
This study will use panel data for data collection allowing for quantitative methods to
be conducted which creates several limitations. First, the data will consist only of
quantitative panel data, so there are no qualitative methods in the study. In essence, by not
having qualitative data, this study does not allow a deeper substantive and contextual
examination of IHE autonomy in Virginia that could come with qualitative data, such as that
provided through interviews. Further, the study uses quantitative data; therefore, research
questions are limited to data that has been previously collected. Additionally, the data will
also not be randomized. Comparison IHEs were chosen based on their non-autonomy
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status. Those institutions could have factors that contribute to outcome variables regardless
of their autonomy status. The study is also limited to one state. Currently, there are five
IHEs in Virginia with Autonomy III classification. Of the Autonomy III IHEs, VCU is the
only IHE in the Commonwealth of Virginia that provides an adequate amount of data before
and after receiving Autonomy III status. VCU received Autonomy III in 2008 and went into
effect in 2009. That provides three years of pre-autonomy data and six years of postAutonomy III data. This study will only focus on one Autonomy III IHE rather than all five
of the Autonomy III IHEs in Virginia. Finally, this study will only use comparisons of IHEs
in Virginia, which limits generalizability.
Organization of the Study
This chapter provides a background on the changing landscape of higher education.
Further, this chapter provides an overview that explains the potential contributions of
research on autonomy at IHEs in the United States. Chapter 2 explores relevant literature on
the historical changes in higher education, entrepreneurialism or academic capitalism,
autonomy and the measurement of autonomy. It will also explore the mismatch of ideas
between IHEs and state governments, state funding mechanisms, and finally, a review of
Virginia Commonwealth University and the Commonwealth of Virginia’s autonomy
system. Chapter 3 details the theory and methodology of the study. Chapter 4 discusses the
results of the study, and Chapter 5 provide a thorough discussion of the results and the
implications for future research.
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review
This literature review seeks to examine connections and potential connections between
IHE autonomy and enrollment patterns, as well as university expenditures. The literature review
will explore multiple areas. First, I will provide a brief history of higher education and its
transition from a liberal arts focus to an entrepreneurial focus. Secondly, this chapter explores is
provided. Second, entrepreneurialism/academic capitalism (AC) and Autonomy will be
discussed. Third, institutional autonomy and its different forms. The next section discusses the
entrepreneurial university's ideas, followed by fourth area covered will be a review of different
measurement models used to measure autonomy. The mismatch between IHEs and state
governments will be reviewed. State funding and decision-making will be explored. Finally, I
will provide an in-depth review of Virginia Commonwealth University and the autonomy system
in Virginia is provided.
The Transition from the Liberal Arts IHE to the Entrepreneurial IHE
American higher education began to emerge during the colonial period in American
history. Since the founding of Harvard College in 1636, American higher education has
constantly evolved. Thelin (2019) refers to the early start of higher education in America as the
Colonial Period. The English settlers in America brought the university idea with them. The
focus of the university during the Colonial Period was to educate clergymen and train them for
the ministry. As a result, higher education during the Colonial Period was reserved for white,
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Christian males. During the early 1800s to 1860s, the number of colleges and
universities increased substantially. With this new era, educational opportunities arose within
medicine, engineering, and law. Also, teaching opportunities arose within colleges and
universities, and women began attending college during this period to become teachers.
During the mid-nineteenth century, the first federal higher education law, the Morrill Act
of 1862, was passed. This legislation marked the first time that the federal government became
directly involved with higher education. The Morrill Act of 1862 created Land Grant Institutions
focusing on agriculture, mechanical and military sciences, and liberal arts education. The
Second Morrill Act of 1890 provided federal funds to finance African American higher
education and created historically black colleges and universities.
As described by Goldin and Katz (1999), the Formative Years ranged from roughly 1890
to 1940 marked key formative years in the development of the 1940s.contemporary university.
Goldin and Katz (1999) describe how during this period that colleges and universities started to
focus on chemistry, physics, and the manufacturing process involved in producing steel, rubber,
and other goods. In other words, higher education began specializing to train college attendees
for particular purposes. IHE enrollment also increased during this period from previous eras. As
enrollment increased and faculty became more specialized, research institutions emerged as the
predominant force in higher education. This trend continued through World War II when U.S.
higher education then entered what has been termed a golden age (Thelin 2004, 2011, 2019).
After World War II, American veterans needed assistance transitioning back into society
and the workforce. The federal government worked to aid veterans transitioning back into the
United States and eventually passed one of the most prominent higher education laws in history
with the Servicemen's Readjustment Act, famously known as the G.I. Bill. The influx of
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students entering college, researchers dubbed this period as helped spur the Golden Age of
higher education, which spanned from 1945 to 1970 (Thelin 2019). Further, the federal
government became more involved in higher education in addition to measures like the G.I. Bill
that boosted enrollment. During the Cold War era, the United States counted on IHEs to conduct
research to ensure the country stayed ahead of the Soviet Union. To achieve this lofty goal, the
United States created grant awarding agencies such as the National Institutes of Health and the
National Science Foundation. During this golden age, IHEs experienced an enormous surge in
enrollment and an increased focus on research, which was aided substantially by an influx of
federal dollars. As a result, the government incorporated oversight and accountability for the
increased federal funding of IHEs.
Over the past 50 years, higher education continued to experience change and periodic
disruptions. With the passage of the Basic Educational Opportunity Grant Program in 1972,
higher education became more accessible. Baum et al. (2013) noted that college has emerged as
the next step in life for high school graduates, and access for women and minorities has
increased during the last fifty years. The paper also noted the increased enrollment of nontraditional students and the addition of for-profit institutions. IHEs are now large, bureaucratic
operations that differ in important respects from IHEs during the golden age. The age that higher
education exists in today has been named by higher education historians as the Age of
Managerialism (Scott and Hart, 1991), or Academic Capitalism (AC) as characterized by
(Slaughter and Leslie, 2001) as one of increasing AC. Aleman (2014) defines managerialism or
AC as the period where quantifiable production metrics govern universities. As IHEs have
transitioned from the golden age to the Age of Managerialism, there has come to exist more
focus on production in a context of reduced state assistance.
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The Entrepreneurial University
Over the last few decades, higher education has been in a constant state of change.
Students can consume education in multiple forms, such as for-profit online degree programs and
massive online open courses (MOOCS) for individuals not seeking a degree without attending a
single on-campus course. To respond to such changes, IHEs have employed multiple methods to
allow the university to continue to be compelling to the customer, but IHEs still face difficult
challenges. Even as state funding for higher education has continued to decline (SHEEO, 2019),
state governments still seek to exert substantial control over IHEs. Toutkoushian (2009) notes
that the decrease in state funding has left IHEs scrambling to shift their policy to combat the lack
of appropriations. The decreased funding within higher education has caused IHEs to think
differently about their funding (Liefner, 2003; Sigahi & Saltorato, 2020). Rabovsky (2012)
insisted that if universities must fund their operations, they should control those funds. Aliyeva
(2016) contended that institutions with less dependency on the government should possess
flexibility with funds as they see fit. Fowles (2014) concurred that universities should allocate
funds in alignment with their institutional mission and goals and not those of the government.
Reduced levels of state funding have helped push institutions to adopt practices associate
with academic capitalism (AC) or entrepreneurialism. Saunders (2007) defined AC as the
"involvement of colleges and faculty in market-like behaviors" (p.2). Sigahi and Saltorato
(2020) described AC as "Administrative Academic Capitalism" (p. 105) because the focus on the
new entrepreneurial university is centered mechanisms of bureaucracy and administration.
Research in this area has concluded that IHEs have become entrepreneurial, profit-based, and
prestige-driven (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Taylor and Cantwell, 2018). The authors declared
that this is a direct result of a lack of state funding. This change in focus to entrepreneurism and
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academic capitalism can have both positive and negative effects on how universities operate and
higher education outcomes. One positive, as identified by Mendoza (2012), is industry-related
collaborations. Mendoza (2012) noted that scientific discovery has never been better in higher
education, stating, "Industry-academia collaborations are not new. Academic scientists have
played a major role in developing new technologies for the government and the public
throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries" (p. 28). The researcher also recognized
benefits for human capital with the AC model and that AC has created prestige among certain
universities where grant writing staff and researchers have a better standard of living. In addition
to the positive aspects of the AC model, negative aspects also exist.
Several researchers have written extensively on the adverse effects that AC has had on
women in higher education (Johnson & Taylor, 2019; Aleman, 2014; and Bensimon, 1995).
Aleman (2014) stated, "The corporate university is governed through quantifiable metrics of
production. In this scheme, faculty publication is objectively measured in quantity, and not
quality, of publication" (p. 110). Bensimon (1995) warned that the "managerial institution would
create an institutional climate that affects women adversely" (p. 109). Johnson and Taylor
(2019) contended that "there is a continued underrepresentation of female faculty members at
public institutions with the highest level of research" (p. 29). Williams (2019) argued that AC
has harmed women's studies programs due to a focus on prestige and research. Other researchers
such as Clark (1998) have eloquently noted that if universities diversity funding models and
obtain greater financial sufficiency, this can create a state of affairs that has been referred to as
active autonomy.
As universities change and become more entrepreneurial, governmental oversight should
arguably also adjust. Governments can either allow universities to be completely autonomous,
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partially autonomous, or continue to govern as usual. Government control of IHEs, according to
Mills (2007), was at its apex after World War II. The oversight trend continued through the
1970s. McLendon and Ness (2003) noted that well over 100 measures to modify higher
education governance were passed or considered and voted on by state governments from 1985
to 2002. According to Schultz (2016), IHEs began petitioning state governments for autonomy
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As a result of these petitions, states began creating activist
governing boards (Bastedo, 2005). Bastedo (2005) defined activists governing boards as boards
with "aggressive and independent use of the policy-making process which resulted in board
organization which was appreciably different from that of a traditional board" (p. 552). These
activist governing boards led to the development of institutional entrepreneurship at IHEs
(Bastedo, 2005)
As a result of AC, IHE culture has changed. Schultz (2016), citing Tierney (1989),
declared, "The culture of an organization constitutes human existence to such an extent that
predication and the ability to reduce organizational meaning to predetermined meaning are
impossible" (p. 28). Tierney (1989) stated that it is crucial to understand the complexity of
campus and policy changes and how these changes impact the culture of IHEs. Tierny (2006)
has argued that only the organization that can adapt, evolve, and redefine itself can effectively
meet its mission and institutional goals.
Defining Autonomy
The idea of autonomy within public IHEs is not a new concept. Glenny (1959), writing
more than six decades ago, discussed the invention of state governing boards and how their
overreach could interfere with a university’s efficiency and autonomy. Berdahl (1971) and
Neave and Van Vught (1994) discussed the idea of an autonomous university. university's idea.
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IHEs have struggled consistently been at odd with state government over autonomy-related
matters.
In terms of its importance to higher education, Glenny and Dalglish (1973) asserted that
institutional autonomy, along with academic freedom and tenure, formed the bedrock of
American higher education. Chambers (1970) argued that undue interference by state governing
boards destroyed the autonomy of the university and amounted to "absentee-landlordism."
Glenny and Dalglish (1973) also warned about outside influences attempting to dictate IHEs'
internal affairs and believed IHEs should be concerned about outside and political influences.
Moos and Rourke (1959) concluded that autonomy was of the utmost importance if IHEs were to
achieve their missions of collecting, disseminating, and advancing knowledge.
Overall autonomy (substantive, procedural, and academic) is defined by Aliyeva (2016)
as "the degree to which public higher-education institutions can govern themselves to meet their
goals and missions without state government control" (p. 11). Aliyeva (2016) argued that any
IHE under the control of a board that governs its actions cannot be autonomous. Further, the
meaning of autonomy for IHEs has evolved based on the unique context of the state political and
economic environment and/or country where an institution exists (Neave, 1988; Tapper & Salter,
1995; Hutchens, 2007; Yokoyama, 2009). Autonomy, at its core, is based on an entity's right to
self-govern itself without excessive or harmful influence from outside entities (Aliveva, 2016).
Fisher (1988) defined autonomy as "the institution's power to conduct its affairs and to
use its resources as it determines, without interference or regulation by outside bodies" (p. 138).
Hutchens (2007) used the definition created by Berdahl, Altbach, and Gumport (1999) that
autonomy is the ability to govern without external interference. Voogt and Volkwein (1997)
defined autonomy as "the degree to which public higher education can govern itself in financial,
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personnel, and academic matters without control by federal, state, and/or external control” (p.
1). Nyborg (2003) stated that autonomy is "the overall ability of an institution to act by its own
choices in the pursuit of its mission" (p.2). In essence, autonomy deals with the extent to which
an entity is free to control its fate by making its own, largely in relation to control over hiring and
financial decisions on whom to hire or how to spend its finances. Altbach, Berdahl, and
Gumport (1999; 2005) classify autonomy in higher education along three domains: substantive,
procedural, and academic. An institution’s overall autonomy can be viewed as a combination of
its substantive, procedural, and academic elements.
Berdahl (1990) indicated that substantive autonomy is an institution's ability to establish
its own goals, and Voogt and Volkwein (1997) defined substantive autonomy as an institution’s
ability to protect its academic core from outside interference. McLendon (2003) noted that
substantive autonomy allows universities to make core academic decisions and the freedom to
choose how to evaluate student learning. Substantive autonomy allows for the freedom to
choose staff and students, as well as to set standards for continued employment and enrollment,
freedom over curriculum, and the freedom to control the internal budget of a campus
(Asby,1966; Hutchens, 2007) According to Berdahl (1971), substantive autonomy encompasses
the power of the university in its corporate form to determine its own goals and programs.
Schulz (2016) compiled literature that breaks substantive autonomy into two distinct pieces: the
university's overall operation and the daily management of university affairs. Berdahl (1971)
and Goodchild et al. (1997) noted that substantive autonomy is an act of a university governing
itself with little to no outside influence, too much oversight can harm the procedural autonomy
(Berdahl, 1971; Goodchild et al.,1997). Further, Goodchild et al. (1997) concluded that
substantive autonomy is the act of protecting the academic core of the university with full
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authority over the admissions process, degree curriculum, and graduation requirements. Schulz
(2016) stated, "These types of autonomies are common within IHEs (in Virginia) and exists with
varying degrees within Level III Virginia institutions" (p. 17).
Mclendon (2003) described “procedural autonomy as pertaining to how institutions go
about achieving the institutions’ substantive goals, including allocation and accounting of funds
and decisions related to personnel hiring” (p. 68). Voot and Volkwein (1997) viewed procedural
autonomy as “the authority to establish administrative, budgetary, and operational policies and
procedure” (p. 2) or). Or, as Berdahl (1990) put it, autonomy represents the ability of an
institution to establish the means and methods by which the goals of an institution will be
achieved. Berdahl et al., Altbach, and Gumport (1999) depicted procedural autonomy as the
“power of the university or college in its corporate form to determine the means by which its
goals and programs will be pursued” (p. 6). Goodchild et al. (1997) believed procedural
autonomy allows universities to develop their own unique operations model and set their own
priorities.
Since the 1970s, tension between IHEs and governmental agencies has increased due to
the complex nature of their relationship. and due to factors considered previously (Newman,
1987; Volkwein, 1987; Berdahl, 1990; Hines, 2000; McLendon, 2002; McLendon, 2002; Hearn
& Deaton, 2006). Terenzini (1996) noted that academics in higher education do not understand
or care about the intersectionality of IHEs and the government. Hearn and Lacy (2009) expand
on Terenzini (1996) by expressing the view that academia has its roots in education, not
governmental policy. Altbach et al. (2005) contend that governments ought to stay out of
academic matters. Academic autonomy in essence is the authority of IHEs to set curricula, teach
those curricula, and conduct research without government interference (Anderson & Johnson,
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1998; Estermann, Nokkala, and Steinel, 2011). Hearn and Lacy (2009) defined academic
autonomy as “academic professionals’ ability to pursue knowledge as they see fit” (p. 947).
Further, Hearn and Lacy (2009) noted that academic autonomy revolves around the idea of
academic freedom that each faculty member possesses and should not be infringed upon by
governmental entities.
Some scholars have discussed the need for some oversight from the government. Aghion
et al. (2008) have contended that IHEs benefit from government regulations and concluded that
the government should set tuition and fees associated with enrollment, but that IHEs should
remain autonomous in all other areas. Longanecker (2008) and Lowry (2004) noted that a focus
on revenue and prestige can negatively impact the quality of their undergraduate education. Dee
(2006) indicated that autonomy and accountability can coincide by allowing IHEs to remain
autonomous if they meet certain state accountability measures. Hutchens (2007) and Berdahl
(1971) noted that some government oversight is needed in the area of substantive autonomy.
Measuring Autonomy
Scholars have spent time defining IHE autonomy, but it is also important to understand
how autonomy at IHEs is applied and how it is measured. Many scholars, such as (Anderson &
Johnson, 1998; Berdahl, 1990; Estermann, Nokkala, & Steinel, 2011; Fisher, 1988; Lowry,
2001b; Volkwein, 1986; Volkwein, 1989; Volkwein & Malik, 1997; Voogt & Volkwein, 1997),
have studied autonomy measurement. According to Fisher (1988) autonomy can be measured by
legislative acts. For example, some states have governing boards that regulate all action taken by
IHEs, but some states have a hands-off approach and allow some flexibility. Aliyeva (2016)
noted that most of the autonomy granted by states deals with the mission of the IHE. Austin and
Jones (2015) and Berdahl (1990) agreed that most of the autonomy granted by state governing
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boards involves substantive autonomy but not operational or procedural autonomy which strips
the IHE of any budgetary, financial, or human resources autonomy.
According to Voogt and Volkwein (1997), measuring autonomy should include
budgeting flexibility, budget form, expenditure oversight, tuition and revenue control, local
taxing and capital authority, and personnel administration. They noted that combining financial
and academic flexibility through survey data could be a way to score autonomy. Anderson and
Johnson (1998) conducted a study in over 20 countries using survey data where IHEs indicated
the level of government intrusion in academics, administration and finance, students and staff,
research and publications, and curricula. Another way scholars have looked at autonomy is
through the lens of history and politics (Aliyeva, 2016). Dill (2001) concluded that IHEs are
operating in the global market and must be able to operate freely to compete. Aghion et al.
(2018) stated IHEs should "be autonomous, in the sense of having legal standing, owning assets,
having the capacity to contract, to hire staff and set pay, and freedom to set budgets and develop
policies of every kind” (p. 50). In essence, to compete in a global market, IHEs must control
their fate, at least to some extent. There is considerable research on higher education and
operations; however, the literature is limited in terms of whether autonomy creates a more
efficient IHE. Connections between autonomy and efficiency merit additional exploration,
which is a primary goal of this study.
IHEs in the United States of America are reluctant to study efficiency. Because
American IHEs do not research technical efficiency, the cited research base for technical
efficiency comes from studies of IHEs outside of the United States. As Andersson et al. (2016)
states, “Several European countries are today facing budget cuts. Defining and measuring
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efficiency and productivity is of the utmost importance to produce the same amount of output
with reduced resources” (p. 205).
Farrell (1957), an authority on the study of efficiency, defined technical efficiency as
“Producing maximum output from a given set of inputs. This distinction is quite a natural
one, but it has also the merit that most of the difficulties are associated with price efficiency,
leaving technical efficiency as a relatively uncomplicated measure” (p. 259). Mayston
(1996) defined technical efficiency as “attempts to maximize student learning and
organizational policy outcomes while utilizing given sets of financial and human resources
inputs" (p. 127). Further, researchers have determined that IHEs function as large
bureaucracies and do not operate with optimal technical efficiency (Barnett, 1994; Leven,
1976; Rolle, 2003)
Across Europe, researchers have studied aspects of IHE technical efficiency.
Andersson et al. (2016) conducted an efficiency study of 30 IHEs in Sweden over two years.
Of the 30 IHEs, half improved their efficiency over the two Andersson et al. years. The
paper noted that improved efficiency revolved around undergraduate graduation rates,
timely publications from research faculty, and the vast array of education fields offered by
the institutions. Andersson et al. (2016) failed to determine what the IHEs did to improve
these outcomes. Thanassoulis et al. (2011) conducted a similar study in the United
Kingdom to review 121 IHEs over three years. Specifically, the authors looked at a single
input that was a combination of operating cost, net resident cost, and catering cost. Outputs
included Full-Time Equivalence (FTE), Undergraduate Enrollment, Postdocs, Quality
Research and Grants, and miscellaneous income. Thanassoulis et al. (2011) concluded that
IHEs in the UK are relatively inefficient in their operation and spending.
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Agasisti and Salerno (2007) conducted efficiency research on 52 Italian IHEs.
Outputs consisted of student enrollment, Ph.D. students, and external funding for research,
and inputs consisted of academic and staff costs and miscellaneous costs. Agasisti and
Salerno (2007) determined that efficiency could be determined by your inputs and outputs
by stating, “Efficiency scores also vary considerably when measures are input and output
based” (p. 455). They concluded that limiting enrollment in some institutions may make for
a more efficient university.
Mismatch of IHE Definitions
Aliyeva (2016) described the tension between IHEs and governing bodies by observing
how “the priorities of institutors and governments are often mismatched” (p. 15). Financial
autonomy has become the primary argument from IHEs in their quest for autonomy (Felt &
Glanz, 2002). Further, as Eckel (2008) argued, if states cannot provide adequate funding to
IHEs, they should not have a say in decision-making. Volkwein (1986, 1989) commented that
public institutions with more autonomy rely less on state funding and acquire more funding on
their own than IHEs with more state funding. Building on Volkwein’s work (1985, 1989), Eaton
(2006) contended that IHEs perform better overall in decentralized environments and IHEs with
more institutional autonomy have better institutional performance. Scholars, such as Alexander,
2000; Ewell, Jones, & Kelly, 2003; Zumeta et al., 2012), contend that state governments
prioritize accessibility and enrollment, higher graduation rates, and diverse student populations
(Alexander, 2000; Ewell et al., 2003; Zumeta et al., 2012). Further, state governments expect
institutions to graduate skilled workers (Knott & Payne, 2004; Payne & Roberts, 2002). Leveille
(2005) noted that state governments want IHEs to focus on job preparation, graduation rates, and
low costs. However, IHEs seek to focus on revenues and prestige.
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Public IHEs tend to focus on prestige and research production (Brewer et al., 2004;
Leveille, 2005; Mohrman et al. 2008). According to multiple scholars (e.g., Slaughter &
Rhoades, 2004; Zusman, 2005, Zumeta et al., 2012), IHEs focus on prestige and research
production because it allows for the additional funds needed to carry out the mission of the
university (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Zumeta et al., 2012; Zusman, 2005) in a time when state
have generally reduced funding as a percentage of the state budget. Zumeta et al (2012) state
"the priorities set by most research universities versus public comprehensive universities are
research first and graduate education second, with undergraduate education a distant third" (p.
141). Aliyeva (2016) noted that the clear difference between priorities for IHEs and state
governments in terms of mission and how to carry out that mission. State governing agencies
still insist on overseeing IHE operations even as government spending dwindles (Alexander,
2000). Aliyeva (2016) indicated that research institutions want to focus on research spending
and state governments are student focused. A function of state governing boards is to ensure that
IHEs are conducting business in accordance with board’s wishes (Knott & Payne, 2004). Most
states have state governing boards that oversee IHEs in their respective states. These governing
boards have the authority to control IHE decisions, financially or operationally (Tandberg,
2013). This oversight behavior by government agencies increases the tensions with IHEs (Dee,
2006; Knott & Payne, 2004; Zumeta et al., 2012).
The state's desire for IHEs and the desires of IHEs differ greatly and produce tension.
Furthermore, the government has put pressure on the IHEs leading them to believe that their
academic freedom is being infringed upon (Berdahl, 1997). Aliyeva (2016) stated that state
governments believe that accountability is their job regardless of how the amount of funding
provided by the state, and IHEs believe that autonomy should be awarded due to the lack of
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funding. As noted by Aliyeva (2016) IHEs can have accountability standards in conjunction
with the state. Aliyeva (2016) stated, "states can enforce accountability policies and still allow
institutions to have full discretion over their decisions and actions that are aligned with their
missions" (p. 19).
State Funding for Higher Education
Literature on funding policy has been of minor interest for scholars in higher education,
but scholars have spent time discussing the politics between state governments and IHEs
(Conner & Rabovsky, 2011). According to scholars in higher education, politics play an
important role in state appropriations (Delaney & Doyle, 2007; Nicholson-Crotty and Meier,
2003; Tandeberg, 2010). Tandberg (2010) noted that there is a direct relationship between
politics and appropriations and that partisanship plays an important role in appropriations and
can change depending on what party is in control of state government. Kallison and Cohen
(2010) noted that in previous eras, funding was provided to IHEs due to the importance of
economic benefit and individual advancement, but as government funding lessens,
appropriations are becoming more political.
The decrease in funding for higher education has created performance-based
appropriations (Rabovsky, 2012). Aliyeva (2016) noted that the "government allocates funds
based on institutional success of meeting state-desired goals" (p. 20). Performance-based
funding is not without its issues, according to scholars. Liefner (2003) noted that IHEs will not
push the envelope and will avoid projects with a high chance of failure. Further, scholars such as
Doughtery et al. (2014) suggested that performance outcomes are set by states and IHEs have no
voice in the setting of outcomes, which creates animosity. Aliyeva (2016) indicated that IHEs
dependent on states are under the control of state governments and have no way out, however;
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there is no research to indicate that performance-based funding has a positive impact on IHE
outcomes. Aliyeva (2016) stated, “when institutions compete with each other for resources, they
may lower their academic standards or quality to increase performance on their state funding
metrics” (p. 21). When IHEs lower their standards, it forces them to cater to state-created
outcomes. Moreover, scholars have noted that performance funding by the state government has
not led to positive results (Dougherty and Reddy, 2013; Fryar, 2011; Rutherford and Rabovsky,
2012; Shin, 2010).
The Commonwealth of Virginia and Virginia Commonwealth University
Concerning IHEs in Virginia, the move toward autonomy began in the early 1990s
(Leslie & Berdahl 1998). From 1990 to 1994, Governor Douglas Wilder and his leadership
issued tuition caps, hiring freezes, and discontinued the long process of university quasiindependence (Leslie & Berdahl 2008). This resulted in a backlash from public universities
which reached its apex in 2004. Due to the backlash, Governor Mark Warner worked with
universities to create the autonomy system in 2004. In 2005 the Commonwealth of Virginia
passed the Restructured Higher Education Financial and Administrative Operations Act, which is
known as the Restructuring Act. The Restructuring Act created three levels of autonomy for
public IHEs in Virginia with Autonomy III providing complete autonomy from the
Commonwealth. To receive Autonomy III, each institution must meet 12 goals set by the
Commonwealth. If approved, universities operate autonomously within six crucial areas. The
Commonwealth of Virginia has 15 four-year public universities, of which six are predominantly
research-based.
According to the State Council of Higher Education for Virginia (SCHEV), the chain of
command in the Commonwealth of Virginia consists of the Governor, General Assembly,
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Attorney General, Secretary of Education, Board of Visitors (BOV), and SCHEV. According to
Schultz (2016), SCHEV was founded in 1956 to promote and coordinate higher education in the
Commonwealth. Each public university has BOV members appointed by the governor. Schultz
noted (2016), "The board is responsible for managing its respective institutions' affairs which
include oversight and development of institutional policies, objectives, goals, and leadership of
the institution" (p. 34). Furthermore, the BOV is responsible for managing the university's daily
operations, approves state appropriations budget requests, and sets the tuition and fees of the
university. The Commonwealth developed three levels of authority (autonomy).
All public universities are automatically vested with Level I autonomy and can remain at
that level if they choose. Level I autonomy offers minimal operational autonomy and IHEs are
under heavy scrutiny by Virginia's government. Level II autonomy allows universities to operate
freely within the three areas of capital outlay, information technology, and procurement. Level
2.5 autonomy adds the area of financial and administrative authority. Finally, Level III
autonomy allows autonomy in several key operational areas. Under Level III, IHEs have
autonomy in the areas of capital outlay, information technology, procurement, human resources,
and complete finance authority. Before defining each of the areas of autonomy, it is important to
understand what the institutions must do to achieve Level III autonomy.
For IHEs in Virginia to achieve Level III autonomy, universities must adhere to twelve
goals set by the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth of Virginia shares each goal and the
accompanying definition on its SCHEV website (SCHEV, 2021). In 2008, a two-year review
was conducted by the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission to the Governor the
General Assembly of Virginia entitled Two-Year Review Initial Higher Education Management
Agreements. Schultz (2016) provided a helpful overview of the autonomous system within the
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Commonwealth of Virginia. Specific definitions and rules and regulations from that audit and
Schultz (2016) are used here to define all twelve Restructuring Act Goals as well as the six areas
of autonomy.
1. IHEs must provide access for all citizens in the Commonwealth, which includes
underrepresented groups. SCHEV provides oversight on this goal by demanding that
IHEs are per the demand analysis, and meet enrollment projections, and degree estimates.
2. IHEs must ensure that the tuition setting will be honest and respectful of family income
and periodically assess how tuition costs impact students.
3. Robust academic offerings, including high-need degrees, are another goal set by the
Commonwealth. The IHEs must regularly assess the need for graduates in academic
shortage areas. Under this performance goal, universities must address the need for
graduates to fill areas with job shortages.
4. To receive autonomy status, IHEs in Virginia must increase their academic standards.
Annual reviews and improvement plans are required in this area.
5. Articulation and dual enrollment are another goal issued by the Commonwealth. This
goal must be tracked yearly and updated accordingly as enrollment rises.
6. Another goal set by the Commonwealth stresses that IHEs agreements must be made with
community colleges to increase the number of community college transfers. Further,
under this goal, IHEs must offer dual enrollment opportunities for high school students.
7. Economic development is critical within the plan for autonomy. Under this goal, the
IHEs must strive to increase economic development in the area in which the university is
located.
8. IHEs must strive to increase the number of research grants, patents, and licenses received.
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9. IHEs must work to create a relationship with elementary and secondary schools’
administrators, as well as determining a plan to improve student outcomes, upgrade the
knowledge and skills of teachers, and increase the leadership skills of school
administrators to enhance K-12 education.
10. A six-year financial plan must be submitted by IHEs and approved by the SCHEV.
11. Financial and administrative effectiveness is also mandated by the government. Under
this goal, IHEs must conduct business in a way that is efficient and respects government
funds. Further, IHEs must use best practices with procurement, information technology,
real estate management, as well as use a vast array of suppliers. Further, IHEs seek out
businesses and conduct business with organizations owned by women and minorities.
12. Finally, each university must submit a plan to ensure the safety of students on campuses.
The Commonwealth of Virginia has applied an intriguing model in relation to
institutional autonomy considerations. On the one hand, IHEs can operate with autonomy if they
meet the 12 goals set by the Commonwealth. However, they must conform to this rigorous
planning process. Are IHEs merely trading one bureaucratic system for another? That is a
question that needs to be examined to determine if autonomy granted by the government has led
to a more efficient operating university. To gain a better understanding of autonomy, the
autonomy needs to be examined. The Commonwealth of Virginia allows for three levels of
autonomy. Each level allows for more autonomy, with Level III allowing for complete
autonomy. Each area of autonomy will be considered more below.
SCHEV is responsible for determining which public IHEs receive different levels of
autonomy. If an IHE is not certified by SCHEV, then those institutions do not receive
consideration for autonomy. According to SCHEV, under the Restructuring Act, all public IHEs
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are automatically enrolled in autonomy level I. Level I autonomy does allow for IHEs to have
some level of autonomy regarding procurement, leases, and capital outlay, but they are closely
monitored by the SCHEV. Level II allows for additional autonomy. With Level II autonomy
IHEs create an MOU with SCHEV to remove certain oversight from SCHEV. If all 12 goals are
met by a university, they move to level III autonomy where the IHE signs an MOU with the
Commonwealth for total autonomy in six key areas and agrees to be monitored by the BOV.
IHEs in the Commonwealth of Virginia are allowed six unique areas of autonomy under
level III. Below is a description of all six areas of autonomy for Level III IHEs.
1. One area of the Restructuring Act is for universities to operate their capital outlay
projects. Specifically, this process focuses on construction projects and land acquisitions.
With this flexibility, Autonomy III institutions are no longer required to bid out specific
jobs to choose the lowest bidder. They also no longer have to navigate the bureaucratic
process of seeking state approval to renovate buildings, construct new buildings, or
purchase new land for the institution. To guide this process, the Commonwealth
established certain rules to follow while undergoing capital campaigns. Autonomy III
institutions must pass all projects over to the BOV, whose function is to monitor and
approve all capital projects. The BOV approves projects, establishes an on-site building
official for daily management, assesses environmental concerns, ensures fair market
value for land acquisitions, ensures efficient project management, and keeps the
government updated on university capital overlay projects.
2. Information Technology (IT) is the second area that the Restructuring Act allows
universities to operate freely under Autonomy III. Universities are allowed to control
major IT projects with the State Chief Information Officer's approval. As with capital
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projects, established rules must be followed to enjoy this freedom. Universities must
create an IT strategic plan, submit an annual report, and develop IT policies for audit
purposes.
3. The procurement of goods and services is another autonomy area afforded under
Autonomy III. Autonomy III institutions are exempt from the Virginia Public
Procurement Act that the Commonwealth requires of governmental agencies. Under this
area, institutions can purchase goods and services under less scrutiny. Of course, rules
are created in this area as well. For example, institutions must make a conscious effort to
purchase goods from small, women-owned, and minority-owned businesses (SWAM
Model). In addition, institutions must use the electronic procurement system (EVA)
provided by the government.
4. The Restructuring Act allows for Autonomy III in lease agreements for real estate
property. Under this area, institutions are not required to seek governmental approval
when leasing space. As in the other areas, certain rules apply. All leases must be geared
toward advancing the universities’ mission, as well as consider the actual need for space.
University legal counsel must review lease agreements to ensure the agreements adhere
to state real-estate law.
5. The fifth area of autonomy granted by the Restructuring Act for Autonomy III
institutions is in human resources. The autonomy exempts institutions from the Virginia
Personnel Act. IHEs with Autonomy III can set their payroll administration, hiring
process, classifications, and promotion practices. This area also allows IHE’s to create
different retirement plans for employees. The government created several rules for this
area as well. The government sets the fringe rate, protects rights and privileges, provides
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counseling services, unemployment compensation, and workers compensation,
incorporates planning and evaluation processes, and requires reasonable paid leave for
holidays, vacation, or other personal uses.
6. The final area of autonomy afforded by the Restructuring Act for Autonomy III
institutions is in financial operations and management. This area allows institutions to
invest financial resources, which includes general and non-general private funds. There
are rules in place that institutions must follow. The financial reporting systems used by
the institutions must satisfy requirements for inclusion in the States Comprehensive
Annual Financial Report (CAFR). In addition, institutions must report to the Secretary of
State any intentions to withdraw from any insurance or risk management program.
According to IPEDS 2019-2020 data, Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) is
located in Richmond, Virginia, and possesses a Carnegie Classification as a Doctoral University
with High Research Activity (IPEDS, 2021). VCU has a total enrollment, considered a mid-size
public institution. of 30,697 students, making it a mid-sized institution. Currently, 47% of
students are white, 8% Hispanic, 18% African American, 13% Asian, 4% non-residential aliens,
3% unknown, and 6% two or more races. Tuition for VCU is $14,596 for instate and $35,904
for out-of-state undergraduate students, respectively. Graduate tuition is $15,086 for in-state
students and $29,084 for out of state students. As of 2018, 7,321 individuals were staffed by
VCU. Specific to this study, VCU has 883 management, 373 business and financial, and 708
office and administrative support staff for a total of 1,964 individuals that are tasked with
administration efforts on VCU's campus.
VCU received Level III Autonomy in 2008, and according to Ohern (2007), VCU applied
for Level III to improve several areas of university functionality such as procurement, capital
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projects, leasing, information technology, and a complete redesign of their human resources.
VCU argued that a redesign of human resources would create visible career paths, professional
development and networking opportunities. It also provides merit-based pay for outstanding
service to students and faculty and achievements that advance the university’s priorities (that
they set autonomously), performance evaluations, and transparency and accountability.
The Commonwealth's autonomy system is free from government interference and
regulation and IHEs with autonomy are responsible for their own oversight. IHEs in the
Commonwealth with Level III autonomy do not have to bid out construction projects. These
institutions can also streamline their institutional management, as well as create their own
enrollment policies. With these conditions in mind, I hypothesize that Virginia Commonwealth
University (VCU), which received Autonomy III status in 2008, will possess a more diverse
enrollment, spend less on administrative managers and staff, and spend less on auxiliary
enterprises after receiving Autonomy III certification. Further, VCU will possess a more diverse
enrollment, spend less on administrative managers and staff, and spend less on auxiliary
enterprises than comparative Virginia public IHEs. To research my hypothesis, I will use DCPD
data to conduct a longitudinal (2005-2015) study of VCU and comparable Virginia institutions
and will address the following research question:
•

How do minority enrollment percentages, administrative expenditures percentages, and
auxiliary enterprises percentages at Virginia Commonwealth University differ before
receiving (2005-2008) and after receiving Autonomy III status (2008-2015)?

•

How do minority enrollment percentages, administrative expenditures percentages, and
auxiliary enterprises revenue percentages differ between post Autonomy III Virginia
Commonwealth University and comparable public IHEs in Virginia?
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Conclusion
IHEs have transformed considerably over several decades. From the opening of Harvard
in 1636 to the Morrill Act of 1862 to the G.I. Bill, IHEs have had to consistently reinvent
themselves. IHEs have entered a new phase of how they operate based on principles and
concepts of entrepreneurialism/academic capitalism, a phrase that is based on generating their
own funds to be self-sufficient. As IHEs continue to generate funding independents of state
support, calls for autonomy will continue. IHEs want the ability to make their own decisions,
define their own missions, and hire employees on their own. This chapter also noted that even
with decreased funding, state governments still want control of IHEs. State governments desire
to control IHEs has led to disagreements on how IHEs should operate. IHEs desire prestige and
external funding for research, whereas state governments are often more focused on enrollment
figures and graduation rates. Further, state appropriations have become political and partisan in
some states. This study will expand on the work of Leslie and Berdahl (2008), Schultz (2016),
and Aliyeva (2016) to examine the effectiveness of the autonomy system in the Commonwealth
of Virginia.
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Chapter 3 – Conceptual Framework and Methodology

This chapter will discuss the conceptual framework and methodology of the study.
Specifically, this chapter will present the research questions and hypotheses, and describe the
instrument that will be used for data collection, and discuss the variables and statistical analysis
to be used for the study.
The primary purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of autonomy at public
IHEs in the Commonwealth of Virginia. This knowledge will assist researchers in learning more
about autonomy in higher education. Enhanced knowledge about autonomy in higher education
will provide researchers and advocates with more data that will allow for meaningful
conversations with state leaders about granting more autonomy to IHEs. This study will also
consider the ability of IHEs to generate and carry out their mission with limited governmental
influence of the government. Finally, this study will lay the foundation for more research on
autonomy in higher education.
IHEs in the Commonwealth of Virginia were chosen as the focal point for this study for
two reasons. This study attempts to provide a glimpse into autonomy in a state where IHEs are
allowed to operate autonomously based on a system permits varying levels of institutional
autonomy. Secondly, Virginia Commonwealth University received Autonomy III status in 2008,
which provides adequate pre- and post-autonomy data. Further elaboration on the
Commonwealth of Virginia and VCU is discussed in the population section of the study.
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Conceptual Framework
The study will employ the Principal Agent Theory (PAT). PAT is appropriate when
analyzing the autonomy of Virginia Commonwealth as compared with IHEs in Virginia
with little to no autonomy. PAT is based on the delegation of tasks between two entities’
resources (Braun & Guston, 2003). One entity possesses a resource (principal actor) but does
not possess the ability to complete tasks; therefore, the principal needs an agent to complete
a task. In turn, the agent agrees to conduct the business of the principal at an agreed-upon
fee, monetary or otherwise. After the agent agrees to complete the task, a
relationship/contract develops between the two actors that are controlled by the principal
(Braun & Guston, 2003). Within higher education, the state is the principal and the IHE is
the agent. According to Lane (2012), typically the actors involved can accept, reject, or
terminate the contract; however, in higher education, IHEs are not able to terminate some
contracts because the IHE is under the control of the state (Aliyeva, 2016).
As noted in the literature, there is a disagreement on how IHEs should conduct
business. State governments require IHEs to focus on education, research, service,
enrollment, and graduates’ career readiness. IHEs, on the other hand, desire to focus on
national and international rankings, prestige, and external funding. Williamson (1985) noted
that the principal/agent relationship can create tension because each actor is interested in
maximizing "personal welfare" (p. 47). Williamson (1985) also noted that the principal
cannot be sure that the agent will perform at the agreed-upon level. With that in mind,
Aliyeva’s (2016) research noted that state governments cannot monitor the daily operations
of IHEs nor do they possess the expertise they are paying the IHE to have. In essence, the
state government expects one thing, and IHEs another, leading to conflict and tension.
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In addition, PAT exists in two forms, behavior-based and outcome-based. Of the two
forms, outcome-based is the form common to higher education. For example, if an IHE
does X they receive Y, if they do not achieve X they do not receive Y. As noted in Chapter
2, funding is outcome-based in that IHEs receive the funding from the state for meeting
state-required objectives. Importantly, while IHEs have met the outcome-based, staterequired objectives, state funding has decreased over the last two decades leaving IHEs
desiring more autonomy.
Aliyeva (2016) used PAT to conduct research focused on the relationship between
IHEs and state governments. They argued that the principal-agent theory is appropriate
because of the contractual relationship that exists between the principal (government) and the
agent (IHEs). The state has funding resources as the principal actor and the IHE has knowledge
as the agent. IHEs possess knowledge that state governments do not; therefore, state
governments must employ agents that possess the knowledge the governments lack (Aliyeva,
2016). Similarly, this study will focus on the relationship between IHEs and state governments;
however, this study will seek to determine how autonomy impacts spending patterns, as well as
enrollment standards.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
In 2008, Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) received the highest level of
autonomy, Autonomy III, under the Commonwealth of Virginia’s Restructuring Act. The
researcher hypothesizes that VCU will possess a more diverse enrollment, have fewer
administrative managers and staff, and earn more revenue on auxiliary enterprises after
Achieving Autonomy III status as well as compared to Autonomy I Virginia public IHEs.
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The study will use DCPD data to conduct a longitudinal (2005-2015) study of VCU and
Autonomy I Virginia institutions and will address the following research questions:
1. How do minority enrollment percentages, administrative staffing percentages, and
auxiliary revenue percentages at Virginia Commonwealth University differ before
receiving (2005-2008) and after receiving Autonomy III status (2008-2015)?
H01 = There is no relationship between minority enrollment percentages and
Autonomy III at VCU.
H02 = There is no relationship between administrative staffing and Autonomy III at
VCU.
H03 = There is no relationship between auxiliary revenue and Autonomy III at
VCU.
2. How do minority enrollment percentages, administrative staffing percentages, and
auxiliary revenue percentages differ between post Autonomy III Virginia Commonwealth
University and comparative public IHEs in Virginia?
H04 = There is no relationship between minority enrollment percentages and postAutonomy III at VCU and comparative public IHEs in Virginia.
𝑌𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝐵1 𝑥𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦

H05 = There is no relationship between administrative staffing percentages and
post-Autonomy III at VCU and comparative public IHEs in Virginia.
𝑌𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝐵1 𝑥𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦

H06 = There is no relationship between auxiliary revenue percentages and postAutonomy III at VCU and comparative IHEs in Virginia.
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𝑌𝑎𝑢𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝐵1 𝑥𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦

Population
The population of interest consists of one university in Virginia, Virginia Commonwealth
University (VCU), and all Autonomy I universities in the Commonwealth. According to
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) 2019-2020 data, VCU is in
Richmond, Virginia, and possesses a Carnegie Classification as a Doctoral University with High
Research Activity. In 2019, VCU’s enrollment was 30,697 students, which is considered a midsize public institution. Within that enrollment, 47% of students were white, 8% were Hispanic,
18% were African American, 13% were Asian, 4% were non-residential aliens, 3% were
unknown, and 6% were two or more races. Tuition is $14,596 for instate and $35,904 for out-ofstate undergraduate students, respectively. Graduate tuition is $15,086 for in-state students and
$29,084 for out of state students. As of 2018, VCU had a staff of 7,321. Specific to this study,
VCU has 883 management, 373 business and financial, and 708 office and administrative
support staff for a total of 1,964 individuals that are tasked with administration efforts on VCU's
campus.
VCU received Level III Autonomy in 2008, and according to Ohern (2007), VCU applied
for Level III status to improve several areas of university functionality such as procurement,
capital projects, leasing and information technology, and a complete redesign of their human
resources. VCU argued that a redesign of human resources would create visible career paths,
professional development and networking opportunities, merit-based pay for outstanding service
to students and faculty, and for achievements that advance university priorities (that they set
autonomously), performance evaluations, and transparency and accountability.

40

VCU was chosen as the investigative IHE due to the longitudinal data analysis
opportunity. VCU received Autonomy III in 2008 as opposed to the University of Virginia,
Virginia Tech University, and the College of William and Mary, all of which received Autonomy
III in 2006. There simply was no pre-data on those IHEs to include in this study. VCU, however,
has three years of pre-autonomy data and seven years of post-autonomy data, which will enable
the study to include both. Autonomy I IHEs in the Commonwealth were chosen for comparison.
The comparison IHEs were used to compare with post-autonomy III VCU. Norfolk State,
Christopher Newport University, Longwood University, Old Dominion University, Radford
University, University of Mary Washington, Virginia Military Institute, and George Mason
University are all four-year public institutions that are considered Autonomy I institutions within
the Commonwealth’s autonomy system. For that reason, these IHEs have been chosen as the
comparison IHEs.
Data Collection and Analysis
The study uses institutional-level data to address the following research questions:
• How do minority enrollment percentages, administrative staffing percentages, and
auxiliary revenue percentages at Virginia Commonwealth University differ before receiving
(2005-2008) and after receiving Autonomy III status (2008-2015)?
• How do minority enrollment percentages, administrative staffing percentages, and
auxiliary revenue percentages differ between post Autonomy III Virginia Commonwealth
University and comparative public IHEs in Virginia?
This study will use Delta Cost Project Data (DCPD) panel data to determine how
Autonomy III impacts auxiliary revenue, administrative staffing, and minority enrollment.
Similarly, to Aliyeva’s (2016) study, panel data sources are used to determine how Virginia
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Commonwealth University, an IHE with designated Autonomy III status, spends their funds as
opposed to IHEs with designated Autonomy I status. Specifically, this study will seek to
determine how Autonomy III impacts auxiliary revenue, administrative staffing, and minority
enrollment.
While Aliyeva (2016) conducted a panel data analysis using similar panel data Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) to determine whether IHEs with financial
autonomy spend their funds differently than IHEs that do not possess financial autonomy, this
study will instead use DCPD panel data. Panel data, sometimes called longitudinal data, is data
based on a time series of observations over several years (Hsiao, 1986, 2007). According to
Hsiao (2007), three primary factors are contributing to the growth and use of panel data. First,
the data are more readily available. As Hsiao (2007) noted, “panel data have become widely
available in both developed and developing countries” (p. 2). Secondly, panel data has a greater
capacity for modeling the complexity of human behavior. Thirdly, it is a challenging
methodology (Hsiao, 2007).
The DCPD was created in 2007 to make the (IPEDS) more usable for longitudinal
research (American Institutes of Research, 2017). In 2012 the database was taken over by the
American Institutes for Research (AIR), while the National Center for Educational Statistics
(NCES) maintained the database. The data stored in the DCPD spans from 1987-2015
(American Institutes for Research, 2017). The DCPD provides data on 184 public IHEs in the
United States (American Institutes for Research, 2017). The DCPD database includes data
related to enrollment and administrative expenditures, as well as auxiliary expenditures. Further,
the DCPD allows researchers to view data regionally, as well as by individual states. Delta Cost
Project Data (2017) defines administrators as managers of financial and business operations, as
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well as all administrative support provided by the IHE to administrators. Further, DCPD (2017)
defines auxiliary enterprises as expenses associated with self-supporting operations that exist to
furnish services to students, faculty, and staff. Examples of auxiliary enterprises are residence
halls, food services, health services, college unions, stores, parking, landscaping, and faculty
housing.
A fixed-effects model will be used to analyze the DCPD data. Generally, there are two
ways to analyze panel data: a fixed-effect model and the random-effects model (Heller, 1999;
Zhang, 2010). The underlying difference between the two models is that the fixed-effects model
assumes that unobserved effects are correlated with independent variables. On the other hand,
the random-effects model assumes that there are no correlations (Wooldridge, 2005). Aliyeva
(2016) borrowed from Kennedy (1992) by stating that if the whole population has been
exhausted the fixed-effects approach is appropriate. In other words, DCPD has exhausted the
population of IHEs; thus, the fixed-effects method is the appropriate method for analyzing the
panel/longitudinal data used in this study.
A fixed-effects regression model was be used to analyze post-Autonomy III VCU and
comparative IHEs. DiD is a data analysis strategy that employs a before and after comparison of
policy. A descriptive trend analysis was be used to analyze VCU before receiving Autonomy III
status and after receiving Autonomy III status. Several researchers have used DiD to determine
the effects of policy change on educational outcomes (Dynarski, 2004; Flores, 2010; Gandara &
Rutherford, 2017; Garces, 2013; Long, 2004; and Kane, 1998; Umbricht et al, 2017). Umbrict et
al. (2017) noted that DiD has become increasingly popular in exploring the implementation of
policy pre-implementation and post-implementation. Garces (2013) noted, “This estimation
strategy has been used in several important research studies to document the impact of policy
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changes on educational outcomes” (p. 260). The Restructuring Act was passed in 2005 and
VCU received Autonomy III in 2008. Therefore, DiD will allow data analysis of VCU before
Autonomy III went into effect, as well as after VCU received Autonomy III status. Further, DiD
will allow for the comparison of VCU with Autonomy I IHEs in the Commonwealth before and
after the Restructuring Act became policy.
Limitations of the Study
This study will use panel data for data collection. The panel data will allow for
quantitative methods to be conducted, but this study is limited in several areas. First, the
data will only consist of quantitative panel data, and there are no which will not yield the
same insights if, for example, a qualitative study had been conducted. Further, the study is
using existing quantitative data; therefore, the data will not be randomized. Comparison
IHEs were not randomly chosen, but rather chosen based on their non-autonomous status.
Further, the study is limited to one state. Currently, there are five IHEs in Virginia with
Autonomy III classification; however, VCU is the only IHE in the Commonwealth of
Virginia that provides an adequate amount of data before and after receiving Autonomy III.
So, this study will only include one Autonomy III IHE rather than all five of the Autonomy
III IHEs in Virginia. Further, this study will only use comparison IHEs with Autonomy I
status in Virginia which will limit the regional generalizability of the study.
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Chapter 4 – Results

This chapter includes a comparison of means at Virginia Commonwealth University
(VCU). Three specific questions are explored: How do minority enrollment percentages differ
between pre-autonomy VCU and post-Autonomy III VCU? How do administrative and
management staff percentages differ between pre-autonomy VCU and post Autonomy III VCU?
How do auxiliary enterprise revenue percentages differ between pre-autonomy VCU and postAutonomy III VCU? Further, these same three questions were explored by looking at minority
enrollment percentages, administrative staffing percentages, and auxiliary revenue percentages at
post-Autonomy III VCU and comparative public IHEs in Virginia.
First, minority enrollment percentages will be explored, followed by administrative and
management staffing percentages, and auxiliary revenue percentages at pre-autonomy VCU and
post-Autonomy III VCU. Due to the small sample, when comparing pre-autonomy VCU and
post-Autonomy III VCU only descriptive statistics were used for analysis. However, important
information was gleaned from comparing pre- and post-Autonomy III data at VCU. With that in
mind, this study examined average differences in minority enrollment, administrative and
management staffing, and auxiliary revenue from non-autonomy (2006-2008) to post-autonomy
III (2009-2015) VCU.
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Findings from Minority Enrollment for Pre- and Post-Autonomy III VCU
Due to such a small data set, means were compared to determine the level of correlation
between Autonomy III status and minority enrollment. There appears to be a correlation between
Autonomy III status and minority enrollment. Post-Autonomy III increased minority enrollment
by almost 6%. There are several possibilities for this connection. First, Richmond, Virginia, is a
very diverse city. It could be speculated that in the time since VCU received Autonomy III the
city became more diverse. Another idea could be that VCU is following the trend in IHEs
seeking to increase its diversity in terms of students, faculty, and staff. VCU is a Research I
Carnegie classification (RI) university and must keep that designation by conducting a great deal
of research. Acquiring funding for research often involves increasing minority recruitment in
STEM fields. To maintain their RI designation, VCU could very well be increasing their
minority funding due to acquiring grants that have that specific call.
The common trait about all the descriptive data above is that VCU has increased its
percentage of minority student enrollment since receiving Autonomy III. Future research is
needed in this area to determine the influence that Autonomy III has on minority enrollment.
Currently, there is not enough data to determine the extent of that influence, however, something
is working at VCU to increase minority enrollment. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for
minority enrollment pre-Autonomy and post-Autonomy III at VCU.
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Table 1
Pre-Autonomy and Post-Autonomy III VCU Minority Enrollment Means
Status
N
Pre
3
Autonomy

Mean
29.15

SD
.360

Post
7
Autonomy

35.01

3.33

Findings from Administrative/Management Staffing for Pre- and Post-Autonomy III VCU
Pre-autonomy and post-Autonomy III means were also compared for administrative and
management staffing. Similar to minority enrollment, there was a decrease in administrative and
management staffing post-Autonomy III at VCU compared to pre-Autonomy III. However,
there could be other reasons for the decrease and since no statistical analyses were run on this
data those possibilities must be discussed. Funding for IHEs, as discussed throughout, has
decreased over the decades and that could have a bearing on administrative staffing. As funding
for IHEs goes down so do the financial capabilities to hire the appropriate number of staff. With
the absolute spending control that Autonomy III provides, it is impossible to determine the exact
reasoning for the decrease, one result could be a reduction in staffing levels.
However, the data show that there has been 2.86% decrease in administrative and
management staffing at VCU post-Autonomy III. Something triggered this decrease and while
not conclusive, it is possible that autonomy status played a role in the decrease in administrative
and management staffing. Free from the bureaucracy formed by government oversight, VCU
possesses the ability to staff the university in the most efficient way possible, so Autonomy III
could have sought to implement staffing reductions in certain areas. More research is needed to
determine the role that Autonomy III played in this decrease, but there is evidence that
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something happened post-Autonomy III that led to a decrease in administrative and management
staffing. However, being that there are no statistical analyses to back that claim the null
hypotheses that there is no relationship between Autonomy III and administrative and
management staffing. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics concerning administrative and
management staffing pre- and post-Autonomy III at VCU. While a relationship could exist based
on the mean comparison, statistical analyses does not establish the hypothesis, so that the null
hypothesis is accepted.
Table 2
Pre-Autonomy and Post-Autonomy III VCU Administrative and Management Staffing Means
Status
N
Pre
3
Autonomy

Mean
7.55

SD
2.61

Post
7
Autonomy

4.69

.035

Findings from the Auxiliary Revenue for Pre- and Post-Autonomy III at VCU
Again, due to the small data set, a statistical analysis was not conducted, but means were
compared to determine the relationship between pre-autonomy auxiliary revenue and postautonomy III auxiliary revenue at VCU. Pre-autonomy VCU had a mean auxiliary revenue of
35.01% and a standard deviation of 13.08 from 2006-2008. VCU had 23.58% mean auxiliary
revenue from 2009-2015 and a standard deviation of 15.49.
Clearly, there appears to be some relationship between post-Autonomy III VCU and
auxiliary revenue. The extent of that relationship is unknown, but a relationship exists. Several
ideas about the reasons for this change are possible. One idea is that these changes occurred
because VCU had more freedom to purchase goods and services in a way to be more responsive
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leading to a decrease in auxiliary revenue post-Autonomy III. Another possibility is that preAutonomy VCU accepted the lowest bids for its auxiliary enterprises, whereas post-Autonomy
III, VCU paid more for what they believed to be a better service. Further, post-Autonomy III
VCU could have kept auxiliary price relatively consistent to pre-Autonomy VCU creating a
smaller amount of revenue. However, this change in revenue could be unrelated to autonomy in
any capacity. Future research is needed as there is a definite correlation that could help identify
the potential relationship between Autonomy III at VCU and auxiliary revenue. Table 3
provides descriptive statistics for pre-autonomy auxiliary revenue and post-Autonomy III
revenue at VCU. In this specific case, the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between
auxiliary revenue and autonomy is accepted, due to the lack of statistical analysis. However,
there is a relationship worth exploring further and when comparing VCU to its non-autonomous
counterpart, as noted in that section below, VCU has more auxiliary revenue than its nonautonomous counterparts in Virginia.
Table 3
Pre-Autonomy and Post-Autonomy III VCU Auxiliary Revenue Means
Status

N

Pre
3
Autonomy
Post
7
Autonomy

Auxiliary SD
Revenue
Mean
35.01
13.08

23.58

15.49

Findings from Post-Autonomy III VCU and Comparative IHEs Minority Enrollment
Dummy coding was used to create variables that would allow for fixed-effects regression
analysis to be conducted between Virginia Commonwealth and non-autonomous, comparative
IHEs in Virginia. The Delta Cost Project Database (DCPD) (2017) provides data on IHEs
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enrollment in terms of total enrollment and by race. For this analysis, a variable was created that
tallied the percentage of minority enrollment at each IHE. Minority enrollment included
American Indian, Asian, Black, Hispanic, and multi-race students. A simple linear regression
was conducted to test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between minority
enrollment at post-Autonomy III VCU and comparative IHEs in Virginia. Descriptive statistics
are reported in Table 4. Minority enrollment was normally distributed. Standardized residuals
were also normally distributed. Scatter plots and histograms were analyzed and no curvilinear
relationships between the criterion variable and the predictor variables were evident.
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Comparative IHES and VCU Minority Enrollment

Minority Enrollment
No Autonomy

Minority Enrollment
Autonomy (VCU)

Mean Percentages
(2009-2015)
28.99

SD

N

23.28

90

32.12

24.42

10

There was a statistically significant relationship between minority enrollment and
autonomy, F(8,81) = 441.74 p< .001. A large effect size was noted with approximately 98% of
the variance accounted for in the model 𝑅 2 = .978. In essence, when analyzing minority
enrollment over 10 years (2006-2015) there was a statistically significant increase in minority
enrollment at post-Autonomy III VCU compared to the non-autonomous IHEs. Therefore, the
null hypothesis was rejected. Table 5 reports the finding from the analysis:
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Table 5
Linear Regression Results for Minority Enrollment
Predictor
Autonomy
Status
* p < .05

B

SE B

t

p

33.254

1.155

28.787

.000

Minority enrollment shows VCU with a significantly more diverse enrollment than its
comparison schools. Autonomy III IHEs in Virginia are allowed to set their admission
requirements. Non-autonomous IHEs must adhere to admission requirements set by the
Commonwealth. Autonomy could certainly play a role in a more diverse enrollment; however, it
is important to look at all factors of VCU’s enrollment. The city of Richmond, Virginia has a
population of 226,210 according to the 2020 census. Of the 226,210 people residing in
Richmond, 59% are a minority as defined by DCPD. This suggests that Richmond is a diverse
population, which could contribute to a more diverse enrollment at VCU compared to other
Virginia IHEs.
VCU created the Office of Institutional Equity, Effectiveness, and Success (IEES) in
2013. Dr. Aashir Nasim, Vice President of IEES, stated, “diversity is among our greatest assets
at VCU, and our effort to create and sustain an equitable inclusive environment is the best
approach toward leveraging this assist into universal excellence and success.” VCU is
committed to diversity, and it could be that VCU would be committed to a diverse student
population without autonomy, so it is important to mention that programs existed to create a
diverse student population and those programs could have an effect on the student population.
IHEs around the United States are committed to creating a diverse student body and
preparing those students to be productive members of society. The government believes that
they are the ones that must seek those outcomes and IHEs cannot produce those outcomes
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without government influence. However, as VCU has shown, IHEs can be committed to
diversity without government intervention in their affairs. IHEs do not need constant oversight
to ensure their commitment to integrity and they do not need government oversight to ensure that
they reach a diverse student body, they are more than able to produce those outcomes free of the
government.
Findings from Post-Autonomy III VCU and Comparative IHEs Administrative and
Management Staffing
Dummy coding was used to create variables that would allow for fixed-effects regression
to be conducted between Virginia Commonwealth and non-autonomous, comparative IHEs in
Virginia. The Delta Cost Project Database (DCPD) provides data on IHEs staffing in terms of
total IHE employees and administrative and management staff included as a separate data point.
For this analysis, a variable was created that tallied the percentage of administrative and
management staffing at each IHE. A simple linear regression was conducted to test the null
hypothesis that there is no relationship between administrative staffing and Autonomy III.
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 6. Administrative and management staffing was
normally distributed. Standardized residuals were also normally distributed. Scattered plots and
histograms were analyzed and no curvilinear relationships between the criterion variable and the
predictor variables were evident.
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for Comparative IHES and VCU Administrative and Management Staff

Administrative
Management Staff
No Autonomy

Administrative
Management Staff
Autonomy

Mean
6.63

SD
6.88

N
90

7.56

6.24

10

There was a statistically significant relationship between administrative and management
staffing and autonomy, F(8,81) = 2.450 p< .05. A small effect size was noted with
approximately 20% of the variance accounted for in the model 𝑅 2 = .195. In essence, when
analyzing administrative and management staffing over 10 years (2006-2015) there was a
statistically significant increase in administrative and management staffing at VCU when
compared to other IHEs in Virginia. Therefore, the null hypothesis was accepted. Table 7
reports the finding from the analysis.
Table 7
Linear Regression Results for Administrative and Management Staff
Predictor
Autonomy
Status
* p < .05

B

SE B

t

p

5.546

2.048

2.708

.008

The study revealed that VCU had significantly more administrative and management
staff. However, there could be several reasons for this not related to possessing Autonomy III.
First, VCU has a Research I Carnegie classification (RI), which is the highest level of research
distinction a university can possess. A RI university is charged with being a leader in research in
the United States. Being an RI requires large amounts of grant applications and those grants
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must be managed and staffed. It could be that VCU had to hire more administrative and
management staff in research offices to process awards on the pre-award side and manage those
awards afterward. Also, procurement offices would need a large staff to manage the influx of
spending from grants. Further, individual schools or colleges at IHEs are asked to submit and
manage more grants creating a need for additional grant management. Other reasons, of course,
could have accounted for the increase in administrative and management staff. The possibility of
increasing staff could be also be due to a negative outcome of autonomy in the sense that lack of
oversight could have led to less scrutiny in hiring or the number of administrative staff positions
needed. There is also the possibility that the identified correlation did not have any type of
causal connection. However, the data indicate the possibility for some type of causal connection
between heightened autonomy status for VCU and administrative and staff levels.
Findings from Post-Autonomy III VCU and Comparative IHEs Auxiliary Revenues
Dummy coding was used to create variables that would allow for fixed-effects regression
to be conducted between Virginia Commonwealth and non-autonomous, comparative IHEs in
Virginia. The Delta Cost Project Database (DCPD) (2017) defines auxiliary enterprises as
expenses associated with self-supporting operations that exist to furnish services to students,
faculty, and staff. Examples of auxiliary enterprises are residence halls, food services, health
services, college unions, stores, parking, landscaping, and faculty housing. A simple linear
regression was conducted to test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between
auxiliary revenue at post-Autonomy III VCU and comparative IHEs in Virginia. DCPD provides
the percent of an IHE’s revenue that comes from auxiliary enterprises. The percentage takes IHE
revenue and auxiliary revenue and calculates what percentage is auxiliary. That percentage was
used to determine the increase or decrease in auxiliary revenue between the years 2006-2015 for
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the IHEs in the study. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 8. Auxiliary revenue was
normally distributed. Standardized residuals were also normally distributed. Scatter plots and
histograms were analyzed and no curvilinear relationships between the criterion variable and the
predictor variables were evident.
Table 8
Descriptive Statistics of Comparative IHEs and VCU Auxiliary Revenue by Revenue Status

Percentage of
Auxiliary Revenue
with No Autonomy

Auxiliary Revenue
Autonomy

Mean
23.76

SD
22.79

N
90

24.56

28.82

10

There was a statistically significant relationship between auxiliary revenue and
autonomy, F(8,81) = 17.960, p< .001. A large effect size was noted with approximately 64% of
the variance accounted for in the model, 𝑅 2 = .639. In essence, when analyzing revenue over 10
years (2006-2015) there was a statistically significant increase in auxiliary revenue for VCU
when compared to non-autonomous IHEs in Virginia. Table 9 reports the findings from the
analysis. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected that there is no relationship between auxiliary
revenue and post-Autonomy III VCU.
Table 9
Linear Regression Results for Auxiliary Revenue
Predictor
Autonomy
Status
* p < .05

B

SE B

t

p

27.009

4.536

5.955

.000
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Analysis involving auxiliary revenue shows a significant increase in revenue for VCU as
compared to non-autonomous IHEs in Virginia. The data shows that there is something positive
about receiving Autonomy III in Virginia. However, there could be other factors to increased
auxiliary revenues that are worth exploring. IHEs with Autonomy III status in Virginia do not
have to bid out contracts for any job involving auxiliary expenditures. Further, they are allowed
to set their prices for those services. It must be noted that this could also influence auxiliary
revenue as VCU could contract auxiliary expenditures cheaply and charge higher rates. Put
another way, if VCU contracted with a construction company to build a new fraternity house on
campus, depending upon the amount of the contract, VCU sets their dues for fraternities and
sororities. It is possible that VCU chose a cheaper contract and charged higher prices to their
students.
DCPD calculates auxiliary revenue to include the amount of money students, faculty, and
staff pay for auxiliary services. As an Autonomy III institution, VCU not only can hire and pay
doctors as they see fit for example, but they are also able to charge whatever price they want.
Further, Autonomy III IHEs in Virginia possess the ability to charge higher prices for books,
room and board, and food services. All of which, as defined by DCPD, are auxiliary
expenditures and be counted toward auxiliary revenues. While the initial results for the
regression on auxiliary revenues showed a significant increase in revenue for VCU over its nonautonomous comparison schools, more research is needed to further determine the effect of
autonomy within IHEs. A deeper dive into VCU’s auxiliary expenditures and revenues is
needed to gain a clearer understanding of auxiliary enterprises.
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Summary
This section analyzed three different outcomes variables. Minority enrollment,
administrative and management staffing, and auxiliary revenue were analyzed to determine the
effectiveness of autonomy at VCU. I hypothesized that VCU would have a more diverse
enrollment, less administrative and management staffing, and more auxiliary revenue when
comparing pre-autonomy VCU and post-Autonomy III VCU. Further, I hypothesized postAutonomy III VCU would have a more diverse enrollment, less administrative and management
staffing, and higher auxiliary revenue compared to non-autonomous IHEs.
Post-Autonomy III VCU possessed a more diverse enrollment and had less administrative
and management staff than pre-autonomy VCU. However, post-Autonomy III VCU generated
less auxiliary revenue than pre-autonomy VCU.
Auxiliary revenue was significantly more at VCU than at non-autonomous IHEs in the
Commonwealth. Also, VCU possessed a significantly more diverse enrollment than nonautonomous IHEs in the Commonwealth. However, VCU also employed a significantly larger
number of administrative and management staff than the non-autonomous IHEs.
However, it cannot be certain that Autonomy III alone was the primary reason for the
results in this chapter. With that in mind, other possible avenues were discussed that may have
played a role in the outcomes. It is important to know that outcomes can be influenced by forces
that are not associated with the study. Chapter 5 will discuss these findings and what it means
for the future on IHEs not only in the Commonwealth of Virginia but in the United States.
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Chapter 5-Discussion
The purpose of this study was twofold. First, this research was conducted to gain a better
understanding of the autonomy status of IHEs in the Commonwealth of Virginia that was created
when the legislature passed the Virginia Restructured Higher Education Financial and
Administrative Operations Act (2005). Secondly, this study sought to explore what potential
effect, if any, autonomy had on auxiliary enterprises, minority enrollment, and administrative
and management staffing. The Restructuring Act of 2005 changed the landscape of IHEs
operations, and this topic has received little attention, so this research sought to gain a better
understanding of this policy and its effect on IHEs in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
Utilizing the DCPD panel data, this study applied the fixed-effects model to determine
how Autonomy III status impacted auxiliary spending, administrative spending, and student
enrollment. Difference-in-Differences (DiD) was used to analyze data to compare postAutonomy III VCU and comparative non-autonomous Virginia IHEs. DiD is a data analysis
strategy that employs a before and after comparison of policy. Several researchers have used
DiD to determine the effects of policy change on educational outcomes (Dynarski, 2004; Flores,
2010; Gandara & Rutherford, 2017; Garces, 2013; Kane, 1998; Long, 2004; Umbricht et al.,
2017). Umbrict et al. (2017) noted that DiD has become increasingly popular in exploring the
effects of policies pre-implementation and post-implementation. The study employed the
Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) to provide a conceptual framework for this study of
autonomy legislation in Virginia. PAT is based on the delegation of tasks between two
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entities’ resources (Braun & Guston, 2003). The remainder of this chapter is organized into four
sections: 1) discussion of results, 2) implications, 3) limitations and 4) conclusion.
Discussion of Results
The PAT suggests that when a principal hires an agent to do a certain job, the principal
may overreach in the affairs of the agent. In this case, the principal (government) hires the agent
(IHEs) to perform a mission that the principal cannot complete (Braun & Guston, 2003).
However, as noted in the literature there are often disagreements between the principal and the
agent about the agent’s mission (citation). State governments want IHEs to focus on education,
research, service, enrollment, and career readiness. However, IHEs believe their mission should
revolve around national ranking, prestige, and external funding. As Williamson (1985) noted,
there is no trust between the two entities, and this leads to increased tensions. Further, as noted
in the literature, funding for IHEs decreased tremendously in the past few years and has left IHEs
seeking alternative ways to fund their mission. As Aliyeva (2016) noted, state governments can't
monitor the daily operations of IHEs and when they attempt to do so, it leads to IHE frustration,
mistrust, as well as a bureaucratic system that does not operate efficiently.
As noted previously in the literature review, with tensions increasing, the Commonwealth
of Virginia passed legislation allowing IHEs in Virginia to acquire Autonomy III status.
Autonomy III allows IHEs in the Commonwealth to operate free of government and bureaucratic
involvement. In 2005, the Commonwealth of Virginia passed the Restructuring Act that
fundamentally changed higher education in Virginia. Virginia Commonwealth University
(VCU) received Autonomy III status in 2008. This researcher hypothesized that post-Autonomy
III VCU would have a more diverse enrollment percentage, a smaller percentage of
administrative and management staffing, and smaller revenue percentages from auxiliary
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enterprises compared to its pre-autonomy years. Further, the researcher hypothesized that VCU
would have these same changes when compared to Autonomy I IHEs in Virginia. Using these
hypotheses to guide the research, this study provides several interesting results.
Related to hypotheses one and four, the results are quite impressive. For hypothesis one,
there was an increase of 5.86% in minority enrollment between pre-autonomy VCU and postAutonomy III VCU. For hypothesis four, VCU had a 3.3% higher minority enrollment than nonautonomy counterparts. These results are statically significantly at the .05 level. In considering
these two results, one might surmise that Autonomy III status is a reason for higher minority
enrollment; however, one must also consider other potential reasons for the increase in minority
enrollment at VCU. The city of Richmond, VCU’s home, is 59% minority individuals. This
diverse population could be a reason for the higher minority enrollment. Further, VCU has
several programs with a mission to promote and increase diversity on campus which could serve
as a possible reason for the increase in diverse enrollment. This research indicated that VCU
possessed higher minority enrollment, both when comparing pre-autonomy VCU and postAutonomy III VCU and when comparing post-Autonomy III VCU with non-autonomous IHEs in
Virginia. However, autonomy could be the cause of the minority enrollment increase as well.
IHEs intrinsically want diversity and do not need government demanding they increase minority
enrollment. Further, VCU can create new centers and new programs without going through the
bureaucratic paperwork necessary that non-autonomous IHEs must go through to create new
programs. These results warrant more research.
Related to hypothesis two the results indicate a positive relationship between autonomy
and administrative and management staffing. When comparing pre-autonomy VCU with postAutonomy III VCU, there was a 2.86% decrease in administrative and management staffing after
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VCU received Autonomy III. This finding suggests a relationship between Autonomy III status
and administrative and management staff numbers. Even though the result is positive, there
could be reasons for this result not necessarily related to autonomy. As discussed throughout this
dissertation, funding for IHEs has decreased over the past two decades. With government funds
diminishing, VCU likely monitored their spending practices more closely. On the other hand,
autonomy cannot be discredited for this decrease. Free from government oversight, VCU was
able to hire staff only as necessary for completing the institution’s mission. Perhaps VCU
decided that unnecessary administrative and management staff members were hired; therefore,
the institution discontinued overspending in that area.
For hypothesis five, the researcher hypothesized that autonomy would result in less
administrative and management staffing; however, the data does not support that hypothesis.
Post-Autonomy III VCU possessed more administrative and management staff compared to their
non-autonomous counterparts at a .05 statically significant level. There could be a myriad of
reasons not related to autonomy that led to this result. First, VCU is an RI IHE, which means
that VCU is one of the top research IHEs in the United States. Being a RI likely requires more
administrative and management staffing, so it could be that research-heavy IHEs require more
administrative and management staffing. It is plausible that VCU had to hire more
administrative and management staff in research offices to process grant submissions, as well as
manage grant awards. Further related to the RI status, these IHEs likely require more staff in
procurement offices to manage and facilitate the influx of purchases that are necessary to
conduct funded research. In addition, individual schools or colleges within IHEs are required to
submit more grant proposals within RI status and, thus creating a need for additional grant
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management staff. In essence, VCU had a large presence of administrative and management
staff because these staff are necessary, not because VCU abused the Autonomy III status.
Hypothesis three compared pre-Autonomy VCU with post-Autonomy III VCU
concerning auxiliary revenue. The researcher hypothesized that post-Autonomy III VCU would
have higher auxiliary revenue. In fact, the results were not as hypothesized. VCU experienced
an 11.43% decrease in auxiliary revenue. There are a couple of reasons for this surprising result
that are unrelated to autonomy. First, VCU does not have a governmental agency closely
monitoring its expenditures. VCU may be spending its revenue in extravagant ways. Another
explanation for this decrease could be that pre-autonomy VCU was required to accept the lowest
bid for services as a part of the state procurement process. Since Post-Autonomy III does not
have this oversight, it is reasonable to speculate that VCU could have accepted more expensive
bids for what they perceived as better-quality services.
In hypothesis six, the researcher hypothesized that Autonomy III VCU would possess
higher auxiliary revenue when compared to its non-autonomous counterparts. The results are
promising as VCU possessed more auxiliary revenue when compared to its non-autonomous
counterparts at the .05 level of statistical significance. These results support a positive
relationship between Autonomy III status and auxiliary revenue. A possible reason for this
positive relationship is that Autonomy III allows VCU to operate completely free of
governmental oversight and conduct business as it deems necessary. This freedom appears to
have a positive effect on VCU’s ability to create revenue from auxiliary enterprises. It is also
important to discuss other possibilities for this increase in revenue. Autonomy III allows VCU
the ability to pay entities for services without bidding those services out to multiple vendors, and
allows VCU to set the prices for those services. The positive results in findings could be due to
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VCU hiring cheaper vendors for providing these services and then charging higher prices. When
you consider all the areas that are within auxiliary expenditures, it must be noted that other
factors could have impacted VCU’s increased revenue after receiving Autonomy III status.
These results are promising, and more research is needed in this area.
This study sought to gain a better understanding of autonomy at VCU, both when
comparing pre-autonomy VCU with post-Autonomy III VCU and when comparing postAutonomy III VCU and comparative non-autonomous IHEs in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
Several interesting findings related to the researcher’s hypotheses were noted. The impact of
autonomy on IHEs is an area with little research, thus, IHEs have little evidence to utilize when
making decisions about seeking autonomy status. This study provided key insight into
autonomy, and the results could have implications for the future of higher education.
Implications
Based on this research, there are clearly multiple correlations between autonomy and how
IHEs operate. To date, there are only two other studies that have analyzed autonomy in the
Commonwealth of Virginia. Leslie and Berdahl (2008) conducted a study to determine what
autonomy would mean for IHEs and how IHEs determined their goals with no government
oversight. However, this research is nearly thirteen years old, and only three IHEs in the
commonwealth had Autonomy III status at the time of publication. Schultz (2016) conducted a
qualitative case study and determined that IHE administrators at Autonomy III IHEs in Virginia
had positive opinions about Autonomy III, but this research was conducted five years ago. Since
Schultz’s case study research (2016), little attention has been paid to autonomy. Both Leslie &
Berdahl (2008) and Schultz (2016), along with this dissertation, found promising results about
the provision of autonomy for IHEs. There is still very little attention given to the idea, and the
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implications related to autonomy in higher education are important for the future of IHEs in
America.
Three initial IHEs in Virginia received immediate Autonomy III status upon the passage
of the legislation. Virginia Commonwealth University received Autonomy III status in 2008 and
the final institution, James Madison University, received Autonomy III in 2019 after failed
attempts in 2009 and 2016. As of this research, five other institutions attempted to reach
Autonomy III but were denied. It is important to determine why universities in the
Commonwealth continue to seek Autonomy III approval, as well as the impact of Autonomy III
on IHEs and how researchers can measure that impact.
First, it is important to determine why Virginia IHEs continue to seek Autonomy III.
One possible explanation is related to the role that prestige plays. Certainly, all IHEs wish to be
labeled as one of the top IHEs in America, so perhaps IHEs in Virginia desire to continue to
pursue Autonomy III to receive a more prestigious label. Because states and IHEs differ on what
an IHE’s mission and vision should be, the relationship between IHEs and state are consistently
strained. The IHEs’ focus on prestige and research production creates divisiveness with the
government (Brewer et al., 2004; Leveille, 2005; Mohrman, MA, & Baker, 2008). Further,
IHEs place their priority on prestige and research due to the lack of state government
funding (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Zumeta et al., 2012; Zusman, 2005).
The focus on prestige and research is likely the reason that IHEs in Virginia continue
to seek autonomy. James Madison applied for Autonomy III multiple times since the
Restructuring Act passed and finally received the status in 2019. The reasons for their
constant desire for autonomy could mean multiple things. First, it could be that they want to
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be mentioned in the same light as the other Autonomy III IHEs in the Commonwealth.
Higher education scholars must continue to research autonomy in Virginia to determine if
autonomy is a worthwhile endeavor or if it is related to IHEs simply wanting to be listed
among elite institutions.
Another important implication that will require additional research is related to what
autonomy means within IHEs. Ideally, research is needed to determine if autonomy results
in a more efficient IHE operation. Perhaps in pursuit of autonomy, IHEs simply trade the
state-directed bureaucratic system for a self-imposed bureaucratic system. In theory, the
primary reason for autonomy is to free IHEs from the bureaucratic rules and regulations that
impede efficient operation. These results provide some support for the argument that IHEs
do not necessarily need the state-directed bureaucratic system to operate efficiently. For
example, VCU saw an increase in minority student enrollment when compared to the nonautonomous IHEs in Virginia. VCU did not need the governmental rules and regulations to
improve diversity within its enrollment. IHEs intrinsically want a diverse student
population and do not need to navigate bureaucratic rules. With that said, researchers
should explore the process that IHEs use to create their own rules and regulations when
granted Autonomy III status. Because these results point to positive aspects of Autonomy
III status, more research is needed to describe the characteristics associated with each
Autonomy III IHE and to determine characteristics that are linked to more efficient IHE
operations.
There is some evidence that Virginia IHEs with Autonomy III status operate more
efficiently than non-autonomous IHEs (Schultz, 2016). Unfortunately, studies of IHEs in
the United States and efficiency are limited. Most research about efficiency and IHEs was
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conducted about technical efficiency and has focused on institutions Europe (Andersson et
al. 2016). This study suggests the value of continuing research into potential relationships
between autonomy and outcomes in IHEs, including in relation to (2016) state that, “defining
and measuring efficiency. As a threshold issue, future research could help us to better
understand how to best measure IHE efficiency. Perhaps it is best measured by comparing
the number of IHE policies before receiving autonomy to the number of IHE policies
created after receiving Autonomy III status across different departments in the IHE. For
instance, if the IHE was required to adhere to 25 procurement rules and regulations by the
governmental agency before autonomy was granted; and after receiving autonomy, the IHE
created 15 procurement rules and regulations. Currently, the relationship between autonomy
and efficiency is uncertain. More research is necessary to determine the efficiency of
autonomy in higher education.
This study provides compelling evidence for an IHE autonomy system in the United
States. Autonomy could change the landscape of how IHEs operate in the future. With
dwindling government funds, IHEs are interested in making their own decisions; however, a
lack of research in this area prevents IHEs from having the evidence to advocate for
autonomy. It is imperative for scholars in higher education to become interested in this area
to determine what effect autonomy has on efficiency in higher education. This study
provides data that suggests IHEs can operate with government intrusion. Further, is shows
that IHEs are intrinsically cognizant of diversity and financials. IHEs do not need
government to tell them how to operate. IHEs are a place where diverse individuals come
together to learn and think. IHEs do not need government demanding certain outcomes that
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they would be working toward without government intrusion. Perhaps, this dissertation
might be an impetus for a conversation about autonomy and IHE efficiency.
Limitations
This study used panel data for data collection. The panel data allowed for
quantitative methods to be conducted, but this study is limited in several areas. First, the
data only consisted of quantitative panel data, and there are no qualitative methods in the
study. By limiting the study to quantitative data, this study limited in the depth of
understanding and context of what is happening. In order to determine the effectiveness of
autonomy and to gain a deeper understanding of the results, a mixed-methods approach that
combines qualitative and quantitative data would be more advantageous. Further, the study
used quantitative, existing data; therefore, the data was not randomized. Randomized
studies create a more scientific study, and the results from those studies have more
credibility than non-randomized studies. Comparison IHEs were chosen due to their
autonomy status and not by randomization. Future studies should include randomization to
gain a better understanding of autonomy.
Further, the study was limited to one state. Currently, there are five IHEs in Virginia
with Autonomy III classification; however, VCU was the only IHE in the Commonwealth of
Virginia that provided an adequate amount of data before and after receiving Autonomy III.
As a result, this study included one Autonomy III IHE rather than all five of the Autonomy
III IHEs in Virginia, therefore limiting the generalizability of the study. More research is
needed that incorporates all the Autonomy III IHEs in Virginia. It is critical to gain an
understanding of what autonomy means to each IHE and to determine if there is a
correlation between the Autonomy III IHEs and actual autonomy.
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Further, this study used comparison IHEs with Autonomy I status in Virginia which
limited the regional appeal of the study. IHEs with Autonomy I status are no different than
IHEs in other states that are subject to the rules and regulations of the state. Research needs
to include other states and regions to gain a more complete understanding across the United
States of America related to what autonomy might mean for IHEs. Each state operates
differently, and some states do have versions of autonomy. The Commonwealth of Virginia
is the only state where IHEs can govern themselves completely. Autonomy III IHEs in
Virginia possess the complete control over their financial and operations. Some states, do
possess some autonomy. For example, Michigan possesses some financial autonomy,
however; they do not possess to level of autonomy that IHEs in Virginia with Autonomy III
receive. More research is needed to determine how IHEs in Virginia compare to other IHEs
in the United States.
Conclusion
This study falls in line with Leslie & Berdahl’s (2008) case-study data about the
initial repercussion of the Restructuring Act of 2005. Leslie & Berdahl (2008) found that
the first few years were promising in terms of easing IHEs of state-driven bureaucratic rules
and regulations. No other research was conducted until Schultz’s (2016) qualitative study.
Schultz interviewed faculty, staff, and administrators at Autonomy III institutions and found
that autonomy was popular at those IHEs. The current study indicates that freedom from
government oversight potentially affects the ways in which a college or university operates.
For example, IHEs do not need government agencies mandating a more diverse enrollment
or requiring procurement rules for choosing the companies or vendors for campus projects.
Further, IHEs do not need large amounts of administrators and managers on campus. IHEs
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are intrinsically motivated to complete their missions, so it should not be a surprise that
VCU created revenue from its auxiliary enterprises or that it is has a higher minority
enrollment than non-autonomous IHEs in Virginia. Further, it should come as no surprise
that when comparing pre-autonomy VCU to post-Autonomy III VCU that VCU appears to
be more efficient after receiving autonomy.
A primary conclusion from this study is that IHEs do not require government
oversight to ensure that they operate correctly. VCU is financially stable with a diverse
student population. Governmental oversight would likely not help VCU become a higherquality institution. IHE administrators have visions and distinct missions for their
institutions, and they quite possibly do not need such overbearing governmental oversight.
For example, the government is not the only entity that wants to embrace diversity and have
a diverse student body that is representative of the United States. The government is not the
only entity that believes that IHEs should be for career readiness. The government is not the
only entity that wants to use money wisely. These beliefs are widespread in our society;
thus, IHEs do not need the government to dictate how they operate. It is clear from the
study and the previously mentioned research, that there is certainly something positive about
autonomy in higher education. The extent of that positive relationship is yet to be
investigated. Scholars in the United States should embrace this topic and seek to gain a
better understanding of how autonomy influences IHEs operation and efficiency. Until this
subject is taken seriously, the principal-agent relationship will continue to exist and will
result in the continuation of a contentious relationship between the government and IHEs.
Virginia offers a perfect system to study autonomy, so scholars must answer the call to
research this important topic.
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90

90

UMW

90

90

90

90

90

90

LU

90

90

90

90

90

90

GMU

90

90

90

90

90

90

CNU

90

90

90

90

90

90

Variables Entered/Removeda
Model

Variables Entered

Variables Removed Method

1

CNU, GMU, LU,
VMI, UMW, NSU,
ODU, RUb

.

Enter

a. Dependent Variable: PercentageofAuxRevtoAuxExpenditures
b. All requested variables entered.

Model Summaryb

Model

R

R Square

Std. Error of the
Adjusted R Square Estimate

1

.800a

.639

.604

14.34335%

93

a. Predictors: (Constant), CNU, GMU, LU, VMI, UMW, NSU, ODU, RU
b. Dependent Variable: PercentageofAuxRevtoAuxExpenditures

ANOVAa
Model
1

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Regression

29558.787

8

3694.848

17.960

.000b

Residual

16664.276

81

205.732

Total

46223.063

89

a. Dependent Variable: PercentageofAuxRevtoAuxExpenditures
b. Predictors: (Constant), CNU, GMU, LU, VMI, UMW, NSU, ODU, RU

Coefficientsa

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Model B

Standardize
d
Coefficients

Std. Error Beta

1(Constant)

27.009

4.536

VMI

-45.156

6.415

RU

-8.109

ODU

Correlations
t

Sig.

Zero-order Partial

Part

5.955

.000

-.626

-7.040

.000

-.654

-.616

-.470

6.415

-.112

-1.264

.210

-.076

-.139

-.084

20.620

6.415

.286

3.215

.002

.372

.336

.214

NSU

14.179

6.415

.197

2.210

.030

.272

.239

.147

UMW

-13.494

6.415

-.187

-2.104

.039

-.160

-.228

-.140

94

LU

-8.564

6.415

-.119

-1.335

.186

-.083

-.147

-.089

GMU

5.871

6.415

.081

.915

.363

.142

.101

.061

CNU

5.450

6.415

.076

.850

.398

.136

.094

.057

Collinearity Diagnosticsa
Variance Proportions
Condition
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Index
(Constant) VMI
RU

ODU

NSU

UMW

1

1

1.943

1.000

.03

.02

.02

.02

.02

.02

2

1.000

1.394

.00

.04

.03

.02

.02

.23

3

1.000

1.394

.00

.01

.01

.00

.00

.05

4

1.000

1.394

.00

.00

.00

.01

.01

.03

5

1.000

1.394

.00

.10

.02

.28

.00

.01

6

1.000

1.394

.00

.01

.15

.06

.20

.02

7

1.000

1.394

.00

.04

.16

.07

.13

.08

8

1.000

1.394

.00

.24

.07

.01

.07

.02

9

.057

5.828

.97

.55

.55

.55

.55

.55

Residuals Statisticsa
Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation N

Predicted Value

-18.1463%

47.6297%

23.7646%

18.22419%

90

Residual

-51.11350%

43.07144%

0.00000%

13.68353%

90

Std. Predicted Value

-2.300

1.310

.000

1.000

90

Std. Residual

-3.564

3.003

.000

.954

90

95

a. Dependent Variable: PercentageofAuxRevtoAuxExpenditures

Charts

96

97

REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL ZPP
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT PercentMinority
/METHOD=ENTER VMI RU ODU NSU UMW LU GMU CNU
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID ,*ZPRED)
/RESIDUALS HISTOGRAM(ZRESID) NORMPROB(ZRESID).

Regression

Notes
Output Created

23-AUG-2021 14:47:50

Comments
Input

Data

/Users/glruther/Box Sync/Ph.D.
Coursework/Dissertation/IPEDS
Data/Delta_database_87_2015_S
PSS/For Dissertation/Dissertation
SPSS with percenages and no Virg.
State 8.24.21.sav

Active Dataset

DataSet1

Filter

<none>

98

Missing Value Handling

Weight

<none>

Split File

<none>

N of Rows in Working Data File

90

Definition of Missing

User-defined missing values are
treated as missing.

Cases Used

Statistics are based on cases with
no missing values for any variable
used.

Syntax

REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV
CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R
ANOVA COLLIN TOL ZPP
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT PercentMinority
/METHOD=ENTER VMI RU ODU
NSU UMW LU GMU CNU
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID
,*ZPRED)
/RESIDUALS
HISTOGRAM(ZRESID)
NORMPROB(ZRESID).

Resources

Processor Time

00:00:00.40

Elapsed Time

00:00:01.00

Memory Required

8272 bytes
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Additional Memory Required for 784 bytes
Residual Plots

Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Percent Minority

28.9915%

23.28138%

90

VMI

.1111

.31603

90

RU

.1111

.31603

90

ODU

.1111

.31603

90

NSU

.1111

.31603

90

UMW

.1111

.31603

90

LU

.1111

.31603

90

GMU

.1111

.31603

90

CNU

.1111

.31603

90

Correlations

Pearson
Correlation

Percent
Minority VMI

RU

ODU

NSU

UMW

LU

Percent
Minority

1.000

-.221

-.234

.055

.927

-.196

-.238

VMI

-.221

1.000 -.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

RU

-.234

-.125

1.000 -.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

ODU

.055

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

100

1.000

Sig. (1-tailed)

N

NSU

.927

-.125

-.125

-.125

1.000

-.125

-.125

UMW

-.196

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

1.000

-.125

LU

-.238

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

1.000

GMU

.028

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

CNU

-.186

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

Percent
Minority

.

.018

.013

.304

.000

.032

.012

VMI

.018

.

.120

.120

.120

.120

.120

RU

.013

.120

.

.120

.120

.120

.120

ODU

.304

.120

.120

.

.120

.120

.120

NSU

.000

.120

.120

.120

.

.120

.120

UMW

.032

.120

.120

.120

.120

.

.120

LU

.012

.120

.120

.120

.120

.120

.

GMU

.396

.120

.120

.120

.120

.120

.120

CNU

.040

.120

.120

.120

.120

.120

.120

Percent
Minority

90

90

90

90

90

90

90

VMI

90

90

90

90

90

90

90

RU

90

90

90

90

90

90

90

ODU

90

90

90

90

90

90

90

NSU

90

90

90

90

90

90

90

UMW

90

90

90

90

90

90

90

LU

90

90

90

90

90

90

90

GMU

90

90

90

90

90

90

90

CNU

90

90

90

90

90

90

90
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Variables Entered/Removeda
Model

Variables Entered

Variables Removed Method

1

CNU, GMU, LU,
VMI, UMW, NSU,
ODU, RUb

.

Enter

a. Dependent Variable: Percent Minority
b. All requested variables entered.

Model Summaryb

Model

R

R Square

Std. Error of the
Adjusted R Square Estimate

1

.989a

.978

.975

3.65306%

a. Predictors: (Constant), CNU, GMU, LU, VMI, UMW, NSU, ODU, RU
b. Dependent Variable: Percent Minority

ANOVAa
Model
1

Sum of Squares df

Mean Square F

Sig.

Regression

47159.070

8

5894.884

.000b

Residual

1080.931

81

13.345

Total

48240.001

89

102

441.735

a. Dependent Variable: Percent Minority
b. Predictors: (Constant), CNU, GMU, LU, VMI, UMW, NSU, ODU, RU

Coefficientsa
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Model
1

B

Standardized
Coefficients

Correlations

Std. Error Beta

t

Sig.

Zero-order Partial

Part

(Constant) 33.254

1.155

28.787

.000

VMI

-18.713

1.634

-.254

-11.454 .000

-.221

-.786

-.191

RU

-19.589

1.634

-.266

-11.991 .000

-.234

-.800

-.199

ODU

-.668

1.634

-.009

-.409

.684

.055

-.045

-.007

NSU

56.412

1.634

.766

34.530

.000

.927

.968

.574

UMW

-17.100

1.634

-.232

-10.467 .000

-.196

-.758

-.174

LU

-19.848

1.634

-.269

-12.149 .000

-.238

-.804

-.202

GMU

-2.409

1.634

-.033

-1.474

.028

-.162

-.025

CNU

-16.451

1.634

-.223

-10.070 .000

-.186

-.746

-.167

.144

Collinearity Diagnosticsa
Condition
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Index
1

Variance Proportions
(Constant) VMI

RU

ODU

NSU

UMW

1

1.943

1.000

.03

.02

.02

.02

.02

.02

2

1.000

1.394

.00

.04

.03

.02

.02

.23
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3

1.000

1.394

.00

.01

.01

.00

.00

.05

4

1.000

1.394

.00

.00

.00

.01

.01

.03

5

1.000

1.394

.00

.10

.02

.28

.00

.01

6

1.000

1.394

.00

.01

.15

.06

.20

.02

7

1.000

1.394

.00

.04

.16

.07

.13

.08

8

1.000

1.394

.00

.24

.07

.01

.07

.02

9

.057

5.828

.97

.55

.55

.55

.55

.55

Residuals Statisticsa
Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Predicted Value

13.4067%

89.6664%

28.9915%

23.01906%

90

Residual

-6.70218%

9.04370%

0.00000%

3.48501%

90

Std. Predicted Value

-.677

2.636

.000

1.000

90

Std. Residual

-1.835

2.476

.000

.954

90

a. Dependent Variable: Percent Minority

Charts

104

105

REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL ZPP
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT PercentAdmins.Staff
/METHOD=ENTER VMI RU ODU NSU UMW LU GMU CNU
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID ,*ZPRED)
/RESIDUALS HISTOGRAM(ZRESID) NORMPROB(ZRESID).

106

Regression

Notes
Output Created

23-AUG-2021 14:48:10

Comments
Input

Missing Value Handling

Data

/Users/glruther/Box Sync/Ph.D.
Coursework/Dissertation/IPEDS
Data/Delta_database_87_2015_S
PSS/For Dissertation/Dissertation
SPSS with percenages and no Virg.
State 8.24.21.sav

Active Dataset

DataSet1

Filter

<none>

Weight

<none>

Split File

<none>

N of Rows in Working Data File

90

Definition of Missing

User-defined missing values are
treated as missing.

Cases Used

Statistics are based on cases with
no missing values for any variable
used.
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Syntax

REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV
CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R
ANOVA COLLIN TOL ZPP
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT
PercentAdmins.Staff
/METHOD=ENTER VMI RU ODU
NSU UMW LU GMU CNU
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID
,*ZPRED)
/RESIDUALS
HISTOGRAM(ZRESID)
NORMPROB(ZRESID).

Resources

Processor Time

00:00:00.40

Elapsed Time

00:00:00.00

Memory Required

8272 bytes

Additional Memory Required for 784 bytes
Residual Plots

Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Percent Admins. Staff

6.6322%

6.88478%

90

VMI

.1111

.31603

90

108

RU

.1111

.31603

90

ODU

.1111

.31603

90

NSU

.1111

.31603

90

UMW

.1111

.31603

90

LU

.1111

.31603

90

GMU

.1111

.31603

90

CNU

.1111

.31603

90

Correlations

Pearson
Correlation

Sig. (1-tailed)

Percent
Admins. Staff VMI

RU

ODU

NSU

UMW

Percent Admins.
Staff

1.000

.284

-.172

-.097

.195

-.023

VMI

.284

1.000

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

RU

-.172

-.125

1.000

-.125

-.125

-.125

ODU

-.097

-.125

-.125

1.000

-.125

-.125

NSU

.195

-.125

-.125

-.125

1.000

-.125

UMW

-.023

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

1.000

LU

.077

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

GMU

.020

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

CNU

-.227

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

Percent Admins.
Staff

.

.003

.052

.181

.033

.413

VMI

.003

.

.120

.120

.120

.120
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N

RU

.052

.120

.

.120

.120

.120

ODU

.181

.120

.120

.

.120

.120

NSU

.033

.120

.120

.120

.

.120

UMW

.413

.120

.120

.120

.120

.

LU

.235

.120

.120

.120

.120

.120

GMU

.426

.120

.120

.120

.120

.120

CNU

.016

.120

.120

.120

.120

.120

Percent Admins.
Staff

90

90

90

90

90

90

VMI

90

90

90

90

90

90

RU

90

90

90

90

90

90

ODU

90

90

90

90

90

90

NSU

90

90

90

90

90

90

UMW

90

90

90

90

90

90

LU

90

90

90

90

90

90

GMU

90

90

90

90

90

90

CNU

90

90

90

90

90

90

Variables Entered/Removeda
Model

Variables Entered

Variables Removed Method

1

CNU, GMU, LU,
VMI, UMW, NSU,
ODU, RUb

.

Enter
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a. Dependent Variable: Percent Admins. Staff
b. All requested variables entered.

Model Summaryb

Model

R

R Square

Std. Error of the
Adjusted R Square Estimate

1

.441a

.195

.115

6.47570%

a. Predictors: (Constant), CNU, GMU, LU, VMI, UMW, NSU, ODU, RU
b. Dependent Variable: Percent Admins. Staff

ANOVAa
Model
1

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square F

Sig.

Regression

821.915

8

102.739

.020b

Residual

3396.705

81

41.935

Total

4218.620

89

a. Dependent Variable: Percent Admins. Staff
b. Predictors: (Constant), CNU, GMU, LU, VMI, UMW, NSU, ODU, RU
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2.450

Coefficientsa
Unstandardized
Coefficients

Model
1

B

Std.
Error

Standardized
Coefficients

Beta

Correlations

t

Sig.

Zero-order Partial Part

(Constant) 5.546

2.048

2.708 .008

VMI

6.588

2.896

.302

2.275 .026

.284

.245

.227

RU

-2.247

2.896

-.103

-.776

.440

-.172

-.086

-.077

ODU

-.798

2.896

-.037

-.276

.784

-.097

-.031

-.027

NSU

4.854

2.896

.223

1.676 .098

.195

.183

.167

UMW

.632

2.896

.029

.218

.828

-.023

.024

.022

LU

2.583

2.896

.119

.892

.375

.077

.099

.089

GMU

1.473

2.896

.068

.509

.612

.020

.056

.051

CNU

-3.305

2.896

-.152

-1.141 .257

-.227

-.126

-.114
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Variance Proportions
Eigenvalu Condition
Model Dimension e
Index

(Constant
)
VMI

RU

ODU

NSU

UMW

1

1

1.943

1.000

.03

.02

.02

.02

.02

.02

2

1.000

1.394

.00

.04

.03

.02

.02

.23

3

1.000

1.394

.00

.01

.01

.00

.00

.05

4

1.000

1.394

.00

.00

.00

.01

.01

.03

5

1.000

1.394

.00

.10

.02

.28

.00

.01

6

1.000

1.394

.00

.01

.15

.06

.20

.02

7

1.000

1.394

.00

.04

.16

.07

.13

.08

8

1.000

1.394

.00

.24

.07

.01

.07

.02

9

.057

5.828

.97

.55

.55

.55

.55

.55

Residuals Statisticsa
Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Predicted Value

2.2406%

12.1339%

6.6322%

3.03891%

90

Residual

-12.13391%

18.06982%

0.00000%

6.17780%

90

Std. Predicted Value

-1.445

1.810

.000

1.000

90

Std. Residual

-1.874

2.790

.000

.954

90

a. Dependent Variable: Percent Admins. Staff
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Charts

114

DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=PreAux PostAux PreEnroll PostEnroll PreAdmin Postadmin
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.

Descriptives
Notes
Output Created

07-SEP-2021 09:23:22

Comments

115

Input

Data

/Users/glruther/Box Sync/Ph.D.
Coursework/Dissertation/IPED
S
Data/Delta_database_87_2015_
SPSS/For Dissertation/Correct
Perecentages for T-Test
9.6.21.sav

Active Dataset

DataSet1

Filter

<none>

Weight

<none>

Split File

<none>

N of Rows in Working Data

7

File
Missing Value Handling

Definition of Missing

User defined missing values are
treated as missing.

Cases Used
Syntax

All non-missing data are used.
DESCRIPTIVES
VARIABLES=PreAux
PostAux PreEnroll PostEnroll
PreAdmin Postadmin
/STATISTICS=MEAN
STDDEV MIN MAX.

Resources

Processor Time

116

00:00:00.00

Elapsed Time

00:00:00.00

Descriptive Statistics
N

Minimum Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

PreAux

3

21.52%

47.65%

35.0167%

13.08638%

PostAux

7

8.05%

54.73%

23.5786%

15.49892%

PreEnroll

3

28.76%

29.47%

29.1500%

0.36014%

Post Enroll

7

30.00%

38.36%

35.0114%

3.33862%

PreAdmin

3

4.55%

9.23%

7.5533%

2.60684%

Postadmin

7

4.62%

4.72%

4.6857%

0.03505%

Valid N (listwise)

3

PPLOT
/VARIABLES=PreAux PostAux PreEnroll PostEnroll PreAdmin Postadmin
/NOLOG
/NOSTANDARDIZE
/TYPE=P-P
/FRACTION=BLOM
/TIES=MEAN
/DIST=NORMAL.
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PPlot

Notes
Output Created

07-SEP-2021 09:24:46

Comments
Input

Data

/Users/glruther/Box Sync/Ph.D.
Coursework/Dissertation/IPED
S
Data/Delta_database_87_2015_
SPSS/For Dissertation/Correct
Perecentages for T-Test
9.6.21.sav

Active Dataset

DataSet1

Filter

<none>

Weight

<none>

Split File

<none>

N of Rows in Working Data

7

File
Date

118

<none>

Missing Value Handling

Definition of Missing

User-defined missing values are
treated as missing.

Cases Used

For a given sequence or time
series variable, cases with
missing values are not used in
the analysis. Cases with
negative or zero values are also
not used, if the log transform is
requested.

Syntax

PPLOT
/VARIABLES=PreAux
PostAux PreEnroll PostEnroll
PreAdmin Postadmin
/NOLOG
/NOSTANDARDIZE
/TYPE=P-P
/FRACTION=BLOM
/TIES=MEAN
/DIST=NORMAL.

Resources

Use

Processor Time

00:00:01.62

Elapsed Time

00:00:02.00

From

First observation

To

Last observation
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Time Series Settings (TSET)

Amount of Output

PRINT = DEFAULT

Saving New Variables

NEWVAR = CURRENT

Maximum Number of Lags in

MXAUTO = 16

Autocorrelation or Partial
Autocorrelation Plots
Maximum Number of Lags Per

MXCROSS = 7

Cross-Correlation Plots
Maximum Number of New

MXNEWVAR = 60

Variables Generated Per
Procedure
Maximum Number of New

MXPREDICT = 1000

Cases Per Procedure
Treatment of User-Missing

MISSING = EXCLUDE

Values
Confidence Interval Percentage

CIN = 95

Value
Tolerance for Entering

TOLER = .0001

Variables in Regression
Equations
Maximum Iterative Parameter

CNVERGE = .001

Change
Method of Calculating Std.
Errors for Autocorrelations
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ACFSE = IND

Length of Seasonal Period

Unspecified

Variable Whose Values Label

Unspecified

Observations in Plots
Equations Include

CONSTANT

Model Description
Model Name

MOD_3

Series or Sequence

1

PreAux

2

PostAux

3

PreEnroll

4

Post Enroll

5

PreAdmin

6

Postadmin

Transformation

None

Non-Seasonal Differencing

0

Seasonal Differencing

0

Length of Seasonal Period

No periodicity

Standardization

Not applied

Distribution

Type

Normal

Location

estimated

Scale

estimated
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Fractional Rank Estimation Method

Blom's

Rank Assigned to Ties

Mean rank of tied values

Applying the model specifications from MOD_3

Case Processing Summary

Post
PreAux PostAux PreEnroll
Series or Sequence Length

Number of Missing

Enroll

PreAdmin Postadmin

7

7

7

7

7

7

User-Missing

0

0

0

0

0

0

System-

4

0

4

0

4

0

Values in the Plot

Missing

The cases are unweighted.
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Estimated Distribution Parameters
PreAux
Normal
Distribution

Location 35.0167%
Scale

PostAux

PreEnroll Post Enroll PreAdmin Postadmin

23.5786% 29.1500% 35.0114% 7.5533%

4.6857%

13.08638% 15.49892% 0.36014% 3.33862% 2.60684% 0.03505%

The cases are unweighted.

PreAux
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PostAux
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125

PreEnroll

126

Post Enroll
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128

PreAdmin

129

Postadmin

130
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Notes
Output Created

07-SEP-2021 09:24:55

Comments
Input

Data

/Users/glruther/Box
Sync/Ph.D.
Coursework/Dissertation/IP
EDS
Data/Delta_database_87_20
15_SPSS/For
Dissertation/Correct
Perecentages for T-Test
9.6.21.sav

Active Dataset

DataSet1

Filter

<none>

Weight

<none>

Split File

<none>

N of Rows in Working Data

7

File

Missing Value Handling

Date

<none>

Definition of Missing

User-defined missing
values are treated as
missing.
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Cases Used

For a given sequence or
time series variable, cases
with missing values are not
used in the analysis. Cases
with negative or zero values
are also not used, if the log
transform is requested.

Syntax

PPLOT
/VARIABLES=PreAux
PostAux PreEnroll
PostEnroll PreAdmin
Postadmin
/NOLOG
/NOSTANDARDIZE
/TYPE=Q-Q
/FRACTION=BLOM
/TIES=MEAN
/DIST=NORMAL.

Resources

Use

Time Series Settings (TSET)

Processor Time

00:00:01.49

Elapsed Time

00:00:02.00

From

First observation

To

Last observation

Amount of Output

PRINT = DEFAULT
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Saving New Variables

NEWVAR = CURRENT

Maximum Number of Lags in

MXAUTO = 16

Autocorrelation or Partial
Autocorrelation Plots
Maximum Number of Lags Per

MXCROSS = 7

Cross-Correlation Plots
Maximum Number of New

MXNEWVAR = 60

Variables Generated Per
Procedure
Maximum Number of New

MXPREDICT = 1000

Cases Per Procedure
Treatment of User-Missing

MISSING = EXCLUDE

Values
Confidence Interval Percentage

CIN = 95

Value
Tolerance for Entering

TOLER = .0001

Variables in Regression
Equations
Maximum Iterative Parameter

CNVERGE = .001

Change
Method of Calculating Std.

ACFSE = IND

Errors for Autocorrelations
Length of Seasonal Period
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Unspecified

Variable Whose Values Label

Unspecified

Observations in Plots
Equations Include

CONSTANT

PPLOT
/VARIABLES=PreAux PostAux PreEnroll PostEnroll PreAdmin Postadmin
/NOLOG
/NOSTANDARDIZE
/TYPE=Q-Q
/FRACTION=BLOM
/TIES=MEAN
/DIST=NORMAL.

PPlot

Model Description
Model Name

MOD_4
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Series or Sequence

1

PreAux

2

PostAux

3

PreEnroll

4

Post Enroll

5

PreAdmin

6

Postadmin

Transformation

None

Non-Seasonal Differencing

0

Seasonal Differencing

0

Length of Seasonal Period

No periodicity

Standardization

Not applied

Distribution

Type

Normal

Location

estimated

Scale

estimated

Fractional Rank Estimation Method

Blom's

Rank Assigned to Ties

Mean rank of tied values

Applying the model specifications from MOD_4
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Case Processing Summary
PreAux
7

Series or Sequence Length

Post- PreAux Enroll
7
7

PostEnroll
7

PreAdmin
7

Postadmin
7

Number of Missing

User-Missing

0

0

0

0

0

0

Values in the Plot

System-

4

0

4

0

4

0

Missing

The cases are unweighted.

Estimated Distribution Parameters
Post-

Normal
Distribution

Pre-Aux

Post-Aux

Pre-Enroll Post-Enroll Pre-Admin Admin

Location 35.0167%

23.5786%

29.1500%

35.0114%

7.5533%

13.08638% 15.49892%

0.36014%

3.33862%

2.60684% 0.03505%

Scale

The cases are unweighted.

PreAux
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4.6857%
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PostAux

139

140

PreEnroll

141

Post Enroll

142

143

PreAdmin

144

Postadmin

145

146

T-TEST PAIRS=PreAux PreEnroll PreAdmin WITH PostAux PostEnroll Postadmin (PAIRED)
/CRITERIA=CI(.9500)
/MISSING=ANALYSIS.

T-Test

Notes
Output Created

07-SEP-2021 09:27:05

Comments
Input

Data

/Users/glruther/Box Sync/Ph.D.
Coursework/Dissertation/IPED
S
Data/Delta_database_87_2015_
SPSS/For Dissertation/Correct
Perecentages for T-Test
9.6.21.sav

Active Dataset
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DataSet1

Filter

<none>

Weight

<none>

Split File

<none>

N of Rows in Working Data

7

File
Missing Value Handling

Definition of Missing

User defined missing values are
treated as missing.

Cases Used

Statistics for each analysis are
based on the cases with no
missing or out-of-range data for
any variable in the analysis.

Syntax

T-TEST PAIRS=PreAux
PreEnroll PreAdmin WITH
PostAux PostEnroll Postadmin
(PAIRED)
/CRITERIA=CI(.9500)
/MISSING=ANALYSIS.

Resources

Processor Time

00:00:00.00

Elapsed Time

00:00:00.00

Paired Samples Statistics
Mean

N

148

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Pair 1

Pair 2

Pair 3

PreAux

35.0167%

3

13.08638%

7.55542%

PostAux

28.3500%

3

23.28860%

13.44568%

PreEnroll

29.1500%

3

0.36014%

0.20793%

Post Enroll

31.9467%

3

2.76374%

1.59564%

PreAdmin

7.5533%

3

2.60684%

1.50506%

Postadmin

4.6667%

3

0.04509%

0.02603%

Paired Samples Correlations
N

Correlation

Sig.

Pair 1

PreAux & PostAux

3

-.963

.173

Pair 2

PreEnroll & Post Enroll

3

.847

.357

Pair 3

PreAdmin & Postadmin

3

.003

.998
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Paired Samples Test

Paired Differences
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference

Mean

Std.

Std. Error

Deviation

Mean

Pair 1 PreAux - PostAux 6.66667% 36.06765% 20.82367%

Lower
-

Upper

t

96.26368% .320

82.93034%
Pair 2 PreEnroll - Post
Enroll

Pair 3

PreAdmin -

-

2.46610% 1.42380% -8.92279% 3.32946% -1.964

2.79667%

2.88667% 2.60709% 1.50521% -3.58971% 9.36304% 1.918

Postadmin
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